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The Parental Rights of Minors
EMILY BUSSt
When a minor becomes pregnant, she might wish to
undergo an abortion, to place the child for adoption, or to
raise the child herself. If she chooses abortion, the law will
give her some legal protection, but that protection will be
qualified by her minority.' To get an abortion without
notifying or obtaining the consent of her parents, a state
can require a court to authorize her decision, either by
determining that she is mature enough to make the
decision on her own, or by determining that, despite her
immaturity, the decision to abort is in her best interest.! If
she chooses adoption, the law allows her to relinquish her
parental rights, but imposes special constraints to ensure
t Thanks to Edwin Baker, Katharine Baker, Elizabeth Garrett, Jack
Goldsmith, Richard Helmholz, Bernard Meltzer, Lainie Ross, David Strauss,
and Adrian Vermeule for helpful comments on an earlier drafl, and to Damon
Taaffe and Erin Childress for their excellent research assistance. The Max
Rheinstein Research Fund in Family Law and The Stuart C. and JoAnn Nathan
Faculty Fund provided support for this research.
1. While the U.S. Supreme Court has held that minors, like adult women,
have a constitutional right to choose to undergo an abortion, the Court has
allowed states to impose special restraints on minors that would be
impermissible if applied to adults. See Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S. 292
(1997) (per curiam) (upholding a statute requiring parental notice of a minor's
decision to obtain an abortion and allowing a judicial bypass of this procedure
only in limited circumstances); Planned Parenthood v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476
(1983) (upholding a statute requiring parental consent and allowing for judicial
bypass under certain circumstances); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981)
(upholding a parental notification statute without a bypass provision as applied
to minors living at home who have not demonstrated their maturity). Forty-one
states have enacted laws requiring some form of parental involvement before a
minor can undergo an abortion. The Alan Guttmacher Institute, Occasional
Paper: The Status of Major Abortion-Related Laws and Policies in the States,
June, 2000 (Aug. 3, 2000), at http://www.agi-usa.orgpubs/abort law_
status.html [hereinafter Occasional Paper].
2. This framework was first suggested by a plurality of the court in Bellotti
v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643-44 (1979) and has since been adopted, with




that her relinquishment is knowing and voluntary.' But if
she chooses to keep the baby, the law gives her carte
blanche, despite the harm that may come to her, to her
baby, to her parents, and to society as a result. The purpose
of this article is to present, and then attempt to solve, a
puzzle in the law affecting children's rights: Why do we
afford minors the same right as adults to assume parental
authority, when we routinely refuse to grant minors co-
extensive rights in other areas of the law?
The disparity between the law's treatment of minors
seeking abortions and minors seeking to act as parents has
been noted in some of the abortion literature, primarily to
call into question the ustifications given for curtailing
minors' abortion rights. But a look beyond the abortion
context makes clear that the approach to minors' rights in
the abortion context comports with the approach taken in
all areas considered by the courts, including rights related
to speech, association, movement, procreation, and
involuntary confinement. Moreover, the law affords a lesser
degree of protection to minors in a host of other areas that
have received less constitutional scrutiny, including the
right to contract, the right to consent to medical care, the
right to marry, the right to vote, and the right to die.
Qualifying a minor's right to obtain an abortion is right in
line with these other decisions and statutes. It is the law's
approach to minors' parental rights that is out of step.
The Supreme Court has listed three justifications for
circumscribing the constitutional rights of minors-their
special vulnerability, their limited decision making
capacity, and the important role parents play in controlling
their upbringing--that can be applied, more broadly, to
3. See infra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
4. Catherine Grevers Schmidt, Note, Where Privacy Fails: Equal Protection
and the Abortion Rights of Minors, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 597, 632 (1993) (noting
that no state requires parental involvement in the decision to carry a pregnancy
to term, and asserting that "[i]t is therefore questionable whether the motive
behind parental notification and consent laws is a genuine concern over minors'
abilities to make informed decisions, or simply the states' desires to prevent
abortions despite Roe"); cf Katheryn D. Katz, The Pregnant Child's Right to
Self-Determination, 62 ALB. L. REv. 1119, 1163-64 (1999) ("[Ilt is difficult to see
how forcing a minor daughter to go through pregnancy and childbirth fosters
the daughter's health. The risks of childbirth are much greater for the young
mother than are the risks associated with abortion but the law shields the
daughter's decision to maintain the pregnancy from the parent's control.")
5. See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 634.
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account for court and legislative willingness to circumscribe
children's rights in a broad variety of contexts. All three of
these reasons identified by the Court offer strong
justification for circumscribing a minor's parental rights:
the life-long consequences of undertaking parental
responsibilities as a minor are great and frequently
negative; the decision to do so often reflects the minor's poor
understanding of her long-term interests and the nature
and extent of parenting obligations; and a minor's parental
relationship with her child inevitably complicates her
relationship with her own parents in ways that can
undermine their ability to fulfill their parental role. Despite
these strong justifications, however, no state has enacted
laws to effect any limitations on parental rights when
exercised by minors.
In an attempt to make sense of the laws' failure to
regulate children's decision to undertake child rearing
responsibilities, this article, which begins with a focus on
children's rights, ends with a focus on parental rights. I will
suggest that the compromise of parental rights may be
particularly problematic, even if that compromise is well
grounded in the deficiencies of minor parenting. Indeed, I
will suggest that the law trades away parental quality for
parental certainty and indivisibility, presumably on the
view that these aspects of parenting are, in the aggregate,
more valuable to children. I will also suggest that this
trade-off may come at the expense of the very minors
afforded the unqualified rights. Giving parental rights to
minors may serve their children better than it serves them.
I. THE PROBLEM AND THE PUZZLE
Over 400,000 minors get pregnant every year, and of
these pregnancies, half end in miscarriage or abortion, and
half end in live birth.' Among those minors who give birth,
6. Because no such laws have been enacted, the Supreme Court has had no
opportunity to rule on the constitutionality of state attempts to curtail minors'
parental rights. One of the projects for this article is to consider whether such
laws, if enacted, would withstand constitutional challenge.
7. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, TRENDS IN
PREGNANCIES AND PREGNANCY RATES BY OuTCoME: ESTIMATES FOR THE UNITED
STATES, 1976-1996, at 26 (Jan., 2000).
8. See id. at 26-27. According to at least one report, "girls between the ages
of 10 to 14 years are the fastest growing group of parents." Barbara Lowenthal
20001 787
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the vast majority keeps the babies.9 In these cases, the
mother and father are rarely married' ° and the father's
involvement is generally minimal." My discussion of minor
parenting is therefore, more aptly, a discussion of minor
mothering. Much of what I say about minor mothers would
also apply to minor fathers, but to the extent the analysis
would differ, 2 my focus is on the girls.
Becoming a parent before becoming an adult is widely
perceived as a bad outcome in our society." Although there
& Richard Lowenthal, Teenage Parenting: Challenges, Interventions and
Programs, 74 CHILDHOOD EDUC. 29 (1997). While teenage birthrates in the
United States have been declining in recent years, they still are the highest
among countries with comparable economic development. See Susheela Singh &
Jackqueline E. Darroch, Adolescent Pregnancy and Childbearing: Levels and
Trends in Developed Countries, 32 FAM. PLAN. PERsP. 14, 19 (2000) (reporting
that the birthrate of fifteen to seventeen-year-olds in the United States is
roughly twice as high as in England, three times as high as in Australia, and
almost ten times as high as in France).
9. See Alan Guttmacher Institute, Issues in Brief- Teenage Pregnancy and
the Welfare Reform Debate (Aug. 8, 2000), available at http://www.agi-
usa.org/pubs/ib5.html; PANEL ON ADOLESCENT PREGNANCY AND CHILDBEARING, 1
RISKING THE FUTURE: ADOLESCENT SEXUALITY, PREGNANCY, AND CHILDBEARING
61 (Cheryl Hayes ed., 1987) (estimating that nearly 95% of teenagers who give
birth keep the babies). Note that this information includes all teenagers, not
just minors, a mismatch reflected in some other citations as well. The majority
of the literature on young parents focuses on all teenage parents rather than
parents under eighteen. I cite to these more general discussions where minor-
specific information is not available.
10. Stephanie J. Ventura et al., U.S. DEPT. HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,
NAT'L VITAL STAT. REP. Vol. 47, No. 10., Declines in Teenage Birth Rates, 1991-
1997: National and State Patterns, (Dec. 17, 1998) (reporting that, in 1997, 87%
of the fifteen to seventeen-year-olds who gave birth were unmarried).
11. See P. Lindsay Chase-Landsdale et al., Research and Programs for
Adolescent Mothers: Missing Links and Future Promises, 40 FAM. REL. 396, 396
(1991) (reporting that the majority of teen mothers raise their children without
sustained involvement of the children's fathers); ELAINE BELL KAPLAN, NOT OUR
KIND OF GIRL 86-105 (1997) (reporting findings from a qualitative study of
thirty-two teen mothers, ages fourteen to nineteen, that most of their babies'
fathers were not involved, and many fathers broke off their relationships with
the mothers when they learned of the pregnancy).
12. Among other differences, there are far fewer minor fathers than
mothers, for the fathers of children born to teenage mothers are often adults.
See Laura Duberstein Lindberg et al., Age Differences Between Minors Who Give
Birth and Their Adult Partners, 29 FAm. PLAN. PERSP. 61 (1997) (reporting that
50% of the minor mothers between the ages of fifteen and seventeenhad
partners who were twenty years old or older).
13. See Frank Furstenberg, As the Pendulum Swings: Teenage Childbearing
and Social Concern, 40 FAM. REL. 127 (1991) (noting that the problem of
teenage parenthood has "attracted almost limitless attention from scholars,
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is considerable disagreement about the nature and extent of
the harm caused by adolescent parenting,14 most policy
analysts and social scientists agree that adolescent
parenting has some harmful effects on these parents,
through lost opportunities for education, work or
marriage, ' and on their children, through an increased risk
of health, educational and developmental problems,
unstable living arrangements or an attenuated relationship
with their fathers. 6 The costs to the minor mother and her
policymakers, and the public at large"). But see Arlene T. Geronimus, Teenage
Childbearing and Personal Responsibility: An Alternative View, 112 POLL. SCI.Q. 405, 421 (1997) (arguing that early childbearing among poor urban African
American families may reflect rational and responsible decision making by
adolescents and their elders aimed at "maximizing children's well-being in hard
circumstances"); Linda M. Burton, Teenage Childbearing as an Alternative Life-
Course Strategy in Multigenerational Black Families, 1 HUM. NATURE 123
(1990) (suggesting that shorter life spans, a separation of reproduction from
marriage, and intergenerational care-giving have made bearing children in
adolescence a good strategy for some African American families).
14. See Deborah Jones Merritt, Ending Poverty by Cutting Teenaged Births:
Promise, Failure, and Paths to the Future, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 441, 455-59 (1996)
(discussing studies calling into question the causal link between teenage
childbirth and various adverse outcomes and noting that "the studies continue
to suggest some independent effect of teenaged childbearing" on family income
and mother's education, although "these effects are smaller than previously
believed").
15. See Daniel Klepinger et al., How Does Adolescent Fertility Affect the
Human Capital and Wages of Young Women, 34 J. HUM. RESOURCES 421, 425,
443 (1999) (concluding that, "while there is considerable disagreement as to the
magnitude of [the] effect.... most investigators have found that early fertility
has a negative effect on educational attainment" and finding that adolescent
fertility significantly reduces the human capital investment, and wages, of
women and that "adolescent childbearing has major adverse socio-economic
consequences"); FRANK F. FURSTENBERG, JR. ET AL., ADOLESCENT MOTHERS IN
LATER LIFE 131 (1987) (Urie Bronfenbrenner & Glen H. Elder, Jr. eds., 1987)
(noting that, while teenage parents often improve their life-situation in later
life, they continue to suffer from diminished economic mobility in part because
their early parenthood restricted their educational and work opportunities, and
in part because it "decreases the likelihood of marriage and marital stability").
16. See Tammy L. Dukewich et al., A Longitudinal Analysis of Maternal
Abuse Potential and Developmental Delays in Children of Adolescent Mothers,
23 CHL ABUSE & NEGLECT 405, 406 (1999) (citing numerous studies
documenting the higher incidence of developmental delays associated with
adolescent parenting); Paul Trad, Mental Health of Adolescent Mothers, 34 J.
Am. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 130, 137 (1995) (citing studies
suggesting that adolescent mothers have unrealistic expectations and
inaccurate perceptions of their children's development and behaviors, engage in
less verbal and interactive behavior, engage in more restrictive and punitive
behavior, and demonstrate less empathy toward their children); Kristin
790 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48
child translate into costs to society-in additional tax
burdens and lost productivity. By one estimate, adolescent
parenting costs the country thirty billion dollars per year. 17
Adult parents frequently lament their child's decision to
assume parental responsibilities rather than pursuing an
abortion or an adoption, out of concern for the costs that
decision will impose on their own child, on their grandchild,
and on themselves.18 Their ability to exercise parental
authority and influence over their own children is
significantly compromised when one of their children
becomes a parent, 9 just as childcare responsibilities for
Anderson Moore et al., Effects on the Children Born to Adolescent Mothers, in
KIDS HAVING KIDS 145, 170 (Rebecca A. Maynard ed. 1997) (finding that
children raised by adolescent mothers receive lower levels of emotional support
and cognitive stimulation and perform less well in school in subsequent years);
David M. Stier et. al., Are Children Born to Young Mothers at Increased Risk of
Maltreatment? 91 PEDIATRICS 642 (1993) (finding that children of adolescent
mothers were more likely to experience a change of caretakers in the early
years of life than children of even slightly older (nineteen and twenty-year-old
mothers) and that, even after controlling for other sociodemographic factors,
children of adolescent mothers were more likely to be neglected than the
children of these older counterparts); Robert Haveman et al., Children of Early
Childbearers as Young Adults, in KIDS HAVING KIDS, supra, at 257 (finding that
children born to adolescent mothers are less likely to graduate from high school,
and more likely to give birth out of wedlock and be economically inactive as
young adults).
17. See Rebecca A. Maynard, The Costs of Adolescent Childbearing, in KIDS
HAVING KIDS, supra note 16, at 284, 308 (calculating that taxpayers pay $7
billion, and the country loses $30 billion annually in lost productivity and
avoidable expenditures of social service resources).
18. While some researchers have suggested that, in some communities,
parents welcome their daughters' pregnancies, others have documented the
strong opposition many parents express to their children's undertaking of
parental responsibilities. Compare Burton, supra note 13, at 132 (finding that
one of the reasons given for early childbearing was to give the adolescent's
mother the opportunity she desired to fiflfill the parenting role), with KAPLAN,
supra note 11, at 54 (finding that, among the thirty-two African American teen
parents (ages fourteen to nineteen) participating in her qualitative study,
thirty-one were urged by their mothers to have abortions).
19. For the effect of adolescent parenthood on the relationship between
adult and adolescent parent, see infra part IIC. Studies also suggest that
adolescent parenthood compromises the attention the senior parent affords to
her other children. See Patricia East, The First Teenage Pregnancy in the
Family: Does it Affect Mothers' Parenting, Attitudes, or Mother-Adolescent
Communication?, 61 J. MARRIAGE & FAm 306 (1999) (finding that mothers of
teenage mothers showed decreased monitoring and communication with their
other children over time); see also Elaine Bell Kaplan, Black Teenage Mothers
and Their Mothers: The Impact of Adolescent Childbearing on Daughters'
Relations With Their Mothers, 43 SOC. PROBS. 427, 437 (noting that the conflict
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their grandchild are thrust upon them." Incorporating an
additional family member into the household also imposes a
significant financial burden on these reluctant
grandparents, frequently already living at or near the
poverty line, and may even jeopardize the grandparents'
health.21
The near universal perception that teenage parenting
should be discouraged has produced a host of legislation
aimed at reducing the incidence of teenage pregnancy.
These laws have attempted to attack teenage pregnancy
and other problems associated with teenage sexuality from
all sides, even taking approaches that reflect potentially
conflicting philosophies and strategies." Laws provide for
contraceptive counseling and services, for the free
distribution of condoms in schools, and for sexual education,
all on the theory that, if teenagers are having sex,
information and contraceptives will reduce the bad
consequences of their sexual activity. Other laws restrict
minors' access to contraceptives and require the affirmative
promotion of abstinence, on the theory that this approach
will alter adolescent attitudes and diminish the prevalence
of adolescent sex. Statutory rape laws are aimed at
reducing older males' willingness to engage in sex with
underage females, 2 and recent welfare reform legislation
included provisions aimed at eliminating welfare-based
between teenage mothers and their adult mothers is exacerbated where those
older mothers are still raising young children of their own).
20. See, e.g., Maureen M. Black & Katherine Nitz, Grandmother Co-
Residence, Parenting, and Child Development Among Low Income, Urban Teen
Mothers, 18 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 218 (1996) (noting that "current trends are
for teen mothers to remain in their family of origin and share caregiving with
the baby's grandmother").
21. Kaplan, supra note 19, at 435, 440 (suggesting that the expectation that
the African American extended family can support teenage mothers is
unrealistic where those families live in increasing poverty and noting the
disproportionate rate of stress-induced illnesses among her study sample of
mothers whose children have children).
22. See Lynn D. Wardle, Parental Rights vs. Minors' Rights Regarding the
Provision of Contraceptives to Teenagers, 68 NEB. L. REV. 216, 218 (1989)
(summarizing positions in the policy debate over how to reduce the problem of
teenage pregnancy).
23. Many statutory rape laws are now couched in gender neutral terms,
though incidence and, relatedly, enforcement is heavily gender skewed. See
Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464, 470-73 (1981)
(upholding a gender-specific law and concluding that the gender-specific risk of
pregnancy justified the distinct treatment on the basis of sex).
2000] 791
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incentives for minors to become pregnant.24 The best
solutions to the problem of teenage pregnancy are far from
clear, but this has not kept lawmakers from trying.
Contrast the volume and variety of these approaches
with the absolute lack of any legislation aimed at
mitigating the three-generational harm imposed if and
when the minor decides to keep the baby and take on
parental responsibilities. In no state does the law require
the minor to consult with her parents, let alone to obtain
parental consent, before acting on these decisions.25 In no
state does the law include minority among the factors that
can justify an involuntary termination of parental rights. In
no state does the law give the parents of a minor parent any
special standing to seek some form of custodial authority,
even shared authority, over their grandchild who resides
with them and much of whose care often falls to them. The
law in no way qualifies minors' legal rights to control the
upbringing of their children, even if they give birth at the
age of eleven.
Where a minor gives birth to a child, there appears to
be only one context in which the law takes account of the
mother's minority, and in this context, the special account
actually promotes rather than discourages minor parenting.
Where the parent who gives up her child for adoption is a
minor, states will often take special care to ensure that her
relinquishment of parental rights was voluntary. A minor's
relinquishment might require court approval not required
for adults, or might require the advice of counsel or a
guardian ad litem, in order to be valid." And courts will
24. 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(5)(A) (Supp. III 1994) (forbidding the payment of
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families funds to unmarried minor parents not
living with a parent, guardian, or adult relative).
25. See Patricia Donovan, THE ALAN GUTrMAcHER INSTITUTE, OUR
DAUGHTERS' DECISIONS: THE CONFLICT IN STATE LAiW ON ABORTION AND OTHER
IssuEs 13 (1992) ("[No state requires a minor to have parental consent to
continue a pregnancy to term [and] [o~nce a teenager has borne a child, she can
decide whether to raise the child herself or put it up for adoption.").
26. W. VA. CODE § 48-4-4 (1977 & Supp. 1997) ("If a person who has
executed a consent to or relinquishment for adoption is under 18 years of
age... the consent or relinquishment shall be specifically reviewed and
approved by the court and a guardian ad litem may be appointed to represent
the interests of the infant parent."); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2115 (1994)
("Minority of a parent shall not invalidate a parent's consent or relinquishment,
except that a minor parent shall have the advice of independent legal counsel as
to the consequences of the consent or relinquishment prior to its execution.");
792 [Vol. 48
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sometimes question the voluntariness of a minor's consent
to relinquishment, on the theory that minors are less likely
to have understood the long-term consequences of their
initial decision to relinquish and more likely to be subject to
coercive pressures than adults in a similarosituation. "
I take note of the court's special concern about the
voluntariness of a minor's consent in the relinquishment
context not to suggest that the concern is inappropriate
there, but rather to highlight the lack of any parallel
attention to how decision making is affected by minority
where a minor decides to keep rather than relinquish the
child. Strikingly, where deficiencies in decision making
associated with immaturity would produce a childless teen
and a successful adoption, the courts attend to the teen's
developmental status, thereby reducing the chance of such
an outcome. But where immature decision making produces
a teenage mother, the law applies no protective brakes.
The degree of harm associated with minor parenting
suggests that states would take steps to discourage or
control minors' exercise of parental authority. Nevertheless,
we see no such efforts at control through law beyond the
efforts to prevent pregnancy already discussed. This
resistance to age-based regulations of parenting cannot be
attributed to the fact that such regulations would fail to
take account of individual differences in the quality of
minor parenting, though there are surely many good
parents among minors who would not require the law's
intervention. Bright age lines never accurately capture each
individual's capabilities and qualifications, but legislatures
have routinely imposed them, and courts just as routinely
upheld them, nevertheless. Nor can the lack of regulation
be accounted for simply by pointing to the constitutionally
protected status of parental rights.' Indeed, in many other
Janet G. v. New York Foundling Hosp., 403 N.Y.S.2d 646, 654-55 (N.Y. Fain.
Ct. 1978) (recommending creation of an Office of Ombudsman for Minors to
ensure that the surrender of a child by a minor parent is a voluntary, informed,
and knowing decision).
27. See, e.g., Adoption of Thomas, 559 N.E.2d 1230, 1233 (Mass. 1990)
(concluding that a court charged with approving an adoption may, sua sponte,
take evidence concerning the maturity and understanding of a minor parent at
the time she consented to the adoption and can appoint a guardian ad litem to
protect her interests, even when she has expressed no objection to the
adoption's going forward).
28. The Supreme Court has described a parent's right to control the
upbringing of her child as "fundamental," most recently in Troxel vs. Granville,
2000] 793
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areas of the law, rights afforded the highest level of
constitutional protection for adults are circumscribed for all
minors, based on their age alone.
The Supreme Court's scrutiny of age-based distinctions
in other constitutionally protected areas bears not only on
our consideration of the constitutional permissibility of
regulating minor parenting, but also on the soundness, as a
matter of policy, of such regulations. This is because the
Court has held that age-based distinctions in treatment can
only be constitutionally justified if they serve important
state interests and, particularly, state interests linked to
children's special developmental status .2 9 A review of the
cases addressing the scope of children's constitutional
rights therefore offers a comprehensive summary of the
proffered justifications for minor's special legislative
treatment, as well as the Court's assessment of the fit
between those justifications and the regulations in
question. In this next section I undertake this review of the
cases to sharpen my consideration of the justifications for
regulating minor parenting, and the closeness of the fit
between those justifications and a variety of possible
regulations.
II. THE SCOPE OF CHILDREN'S RIGHTS
In every context in which the Supreme Court has
considered children's claims of constitutional rights, the
Court has concluded that children's minority justifies some
curtailment of the adult right in question." Children have
__ U.S. __, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 2060 (2000) (plurality opinion) (stating that "[tihe
liberty interest at issue in this case-the interest of parents in the care,
custody, and control of their children-is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental
liberty interests recognized by this Court"); id. at 2068 (Thomas, J., concurring)
(noting the Court's "recognition of a fundamental right of parents to direct the
upbringing of their children"); id. at 2071 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Our cases
leave no doubt that parents have a fundamental liberty interest in caring for
and guiding their children.").
29. See Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74-75
(1976) (noting that the state has "somewhat broader authority to regulate the
activities of children than of adults," where the state has a "significant interest"
that is "not present in the case of an adult").
30. See Carey v. Population Servs. Intl, 431 U.S. 678, 692 (noting that the
Court has recognized, in numerous cases, that children are protected by the
Constitution, but also that "the power of the state to control the conduct of
children reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adults") (quoting Prince
794 [Vol. 48
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some right of free speech, the Court concludes, but what
they can read,' and under what circumstances they can
speak3 2 is significantly limited. Children have some right to
exercise their religion freely, but that right is subject to
more restrictions than the comparable right of parents.33
Children have procreative rights, but their access to both
birth control and to abortion can be more readily
restricted.34 Children have due process rights when faced
with involuntary institutionalization, but those rights are
significantly weakened by their entanglement with their
parents' rights of nurture and control.3 Rights of criminal
procedure also apply to children, but the context in which
those claims often arise significantly diminishes their
v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944)).
31. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (holding that a state
could prohibit children's access to sexually explicit reading material whose
adult readership was protected by the First Amendment).
32. See, e.g., Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) (holding that the
First Amendment does not protect student-authored articles in a school
newspaper published as part of the school's journalism curriculum); Bethel Sch.
Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986) (noting that the First
Amendment rights of students in the public schools "are not automatically
coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings") (citing New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340-42 (1985)). Adult speech is also subject to time, place
and manner restrictions. By significantly restricting children's speech in the
school setting, however, the Court dramatically curtails both the time and the
contexts available for children's expression in the location that most closely
approximates a public space for children.
33. See Prince, 321 U.S. at 167-68 (conceding that a statute preventing
adults from engaging in the religious activity in question would violate their
free exercise rights, but holding, nevertheless, that such a statute could
constitutionally be applied to children because "[tjhe state's authority over
children's activities is broader than over like actions of adults").
34. See Carey, 431 U.S. at 692-93 (1977) (plurality opinion) (applying a less
protective balancing test than that applied to adults in assessing whether the
state's restriction of minors' access to birth control violated minors' due process
rights); Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S. 292 (1997) (per curiam) (summarizing
precedents allowing restrictions on minor's access to abortions, and upholding
the constitutionality of a state parental notification requirement that provided
for a limited bypass option whereby a minor could obtain authorization for the
abortion procedure from a court).
35. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 600 (1979) (concluding that the Due
Process Clause did not afford a child the same right to an independent
commitment hearing afforded to adults and asserting that since the child's
interest in not being committed "is inextricably linked with the parents' interest
in and obligation for the welfare and health of the child, the private interest at
stake is a combination of the child's and parent's concern").
796 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48
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In Bellotti v. Baird, the Court attempted to lay out its
various justifications for curtailing constitutional rights
when applied to children:
The unique role in our society of the family, the institution by
which "we inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished
values, moral and cultural," requires that constitutional principles
be applied with sensitivity and flexibility to the special needs of
parents and children. We have recognized three reasons justifying
the conclusion that the constitutional rights of children cannot be
equated with those of adults: the peculiar vulnerability of children;
their inability to make critical decisions in an informed, mature
manner; and the importance of the parental role in child rearing.
37
Although these three justifications are not well
explained, nor clearly applied, in Bellotti, they do capture
most of the concerns addressed in the cases38 and giving rise
to age-based legislative distinctions. In the discussion that
follows, I will offer a more complete consideration of these
36. See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654-55 (1995)
(concluding that children's minority, and the "custodial and tutelary" power
exercised over them by the school lessened their constitutional protection
against drug testing in the school setting); T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 325 (concluding
that, while a child had a reasonable expectation of privacy in her purse, school
officials need not have probable cause, the applicable adult standard, to justify
a search); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (holding that the due
process clause does not afford minors the right to a jury trial in a juvenile
proceeding that it affords adults in a criminal proceeding). Note that all three of
these cases focus on context (the schools and the juvenile courts) rather than
simply on the age of the rights claimant. As in the First Amendment cases,
however, the restriction of a minors' rights in some of the primary contexts in
which the minor acts, and therefore in which the rights issues arise, has the
effect of affording a narrower protection to minors than to adults. Moreover, the
Court's analysis often blends the context in which minors operate with the
status of minority, noting that the special purposes justifying special
restrictions are tied to minors' unique developmental status.
37. 443 U.S. at 634 (1979).
38. Courts frequently cite to these three factors in analyzing children's
challenges to age-based legal restrictions. See, e.g., Hutchins v. District of
Columbia, 188 F.3d 531, 541 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (applying Bellotti factors to uphold
the constitutionality of a juvenile curfew ordinance); Schlieffer v. Meyers, 644
F.2d 656 (7th Cir. 1981) (applying Bellotti factors to uphold custody
determination that was inconsistent with the child's wishes); Bush v. Dassel-
Cokato Bd. of Educ., 745 F. Supp. 562 (D. Minn. 1990) (applying Bellotti factors
to justify upholding a regulation which prohibited students from attending
parties where alcohol was served); State v. Barlow, 630 A.2d 1299 (Vt. 1993)
(applying Bellotti factors to justify upholding conviction for statutory rape).
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and one other justification for the distinct treatment of
children under the law and will consider the extent to
which each of these justifications support restricting the
protections afforded to children acting as parents.
All the justifications for children's different treatment
under the law are grounded in assumptions about
developmental differences between children and adults.
Although the line the law draws at eighteen (or, for some
purposes, sixteen or seventeen) is inevitably somewhat
arbitrary, it is designed to capture, in some rough form, the
age at which individuals' cognitive, emotional, social and
moral development becomes relatively stable and when an
individual's understanding, behavior and relationships can
be expected to conform to adult standards. 9 Before this age,
the law expects, or at least allows, children to behave and
think differently from adults, reflecting their incomplete
and ongoing process of maturation. While these
developmental assumptions are not always clearly
articulated, they are omni-present in the law's treatment of
children.
A. Vulnerabilities and Opportunities Associated with
Children's Ongoing Development
In Bellotti, the Court points to children's "peculiar
vulnerability" as its first justification for distinguishing
children's legal status from that of adults. Children's
vulnerability can be further divided into two sorts: a
physical vulnerability associated with their reduced size
and strength and the magnitude of the physiological
changes they are undergoing, and a psychological
vulnerability associated with their greater openness to
influence. This second source of vulnerability is also a
source of opportunity, and some of the greatest harms to
children come from a loss of these developmental
opportunities to be shaped in positive ways. Both sorts of
vulnerability-vulnerability to physical harm and
vulnerability to influence, whether harmful or beneficial-
39. Society's drawing of an age line helps to determine, as well as record,
when developmental changes occur. Societies that set the age of adulthood
much younger than we do, or that tie adult responsibilities to life events (such
as the onset of puberty or the entering of a marriage) clearly affect the course of
development leading up to the undertaking of those adult responsibilities.
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have served as justifications for circumscribing children's
rights in numerous cases.4 °
Both sorts of vulnerabilities are implicated by a minor's
decision to become a parent. Pregnancy and childbirth,
themselves, expose minors to risks of physical injury
greater than those faced by adults.4' Far more significant,
however, are the harms associated with teen parenting.
These harms are primarily the harms associated with
diminished opportunities. Parenting responsibilities
interfere with a minor's ability to pursue an education and
develop job skills. Minor parents are less likely to enter and
remain in stable familial relationships with their children's
fathers or other men. While there is some dispute over the
extent to which teenage parenting diminishes options, there
can be no dispute that some diminution occurs.42 Whatever
have been the historic effects of becoming a parent in
adolescence, the prospects for change, for improving the
opportunities for low income adolescents, are greatly
40. See, e.g., Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 661 (noting both that "[s]chool years are
the time when the physical, psychological, and addictive effects of drugs are
most severe" and that "childhood losses [from drug use] in learning are lifelong
and profound"); T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340 (justifying curtailment of children's
Fourth Amendment rights in the school context by pointing to the school's
"legitimate need to maintain an environment in which learning can take
place"); McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 550 (noting that the goal of juvenile court is to
rehabilitate young offenders and avoid an adversarial process in order to show
concern, sympathy and paternal attention to these offenders); Ginsberg v. New
York, 390 U.S. 629, 641 (deferring to the legislative determination that minors'
exposure to the sexually explicit materials governed by the statute in question
is "a basic factor in impairing the ethical and moral development of youth"
(quoting 1955 N.Y. LAWS, ch. 836, § 540)).
Children's special vulnerabilities are also sometimes pointed to as a
justification for recognizing rights. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 627-
28 (1979) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[It may well
be argued that children are entitled to more protection than are adults. The
consequences of an erroneous commitment decision are more tragic where
children are involved.... [Clhildhood is a particularly vulnerable time of life
and children erroneously institutionalized during their formative years may
bear the scars for the rest of their lives."); Carey v. Population Servs. Intl, 431
U.S. 678, 708 (1977) (noting the inappropriateness of preventing parents from
distributing contraceptives to their children, suggesting that "parental
guidance... is especially appropriate in this sensitive area of child
development").
41. See Lowenthal & Lowenthal, supra note 8, at 29 (noting that adolescents
are at greater risk for health problems during pregnancy, and more likely to
have prolonged and difficult labor).
42. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
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reduced, or at least encumbered, where those adolescents
are parents. The considerably greater risks minors face in
undertaking the parental role might well justify imposing
some constraints on a minor's choice to do so.
B. Deficient Decision Making Skills
Children's decision making skills change dramatically
over the course of their minority." Very young children
often fail to grasp the causal relationship between their
choices and the consequences that follow, and grade school
children commonly lack the capacity for abstract thinking
needed to assess the relative value of various hypothetical
futures. By adolescence, however, most individuals share
adults' capacity to think abstractly and therefore their basic
decision making process can be expected to look much like
the process engaged in by adults. The choices they make
may nevertheless be impaired by their minority in two
critical respects: First, their greater impulsiveness may
lead them to act, without engaging in a deliberate decision
making process at all." Second, even where they engage in
a deliberative process, they are likely to assign values in a
manner that reflects their immaturity: They will give great
weight to short-term consequences, and little weight to
long-term consequences; they will attach positive rather
than negative value to risks, or at least fail to account for
the significant costs associated with these risks; they will
place greater value than adults on how others will respond
to the choices they make.45 To the extent we tie rights of
self-determination to the quality of decisions made,46 it
43. For a summary of the development of cognitive capacity throughout
childhood, see Wallace J. Mlyniec, A Judge's Ethical Dilemma: Assessing A
Child's Capacity to Choose, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1873, 1878-79 (1996).
44. See Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence Steinberg, The Cognitive and
Affective Influences On Adolescent Decision-Making, 68 TEMPLE L. REV. 1763,
1780-81 (1995) (reporting limited empirical data suggesting that impulsivity
remains relatively stable between the ages of four and sixteen, and may
actually increase between the ages of sixteen and nineteen, before declining
over the course of adulthood).
45. See generally Elizabeth S. Scott et al., Evaluating Adolescent Decision
Making in Legal Contexts, 19 LAW. & HUM BEHAv. 221 (1995) (arguing that
adolescents' short-term perspective, greater willingness to take risks, and
greater vulnerability to outside influences produce differences in maturity of
judgment that should be taken into account in the law).
46. See Alan Meisel, The "Exceptions" to the Informed Consent Doctrine:
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makes sense to curtail those rights where that quality is
compromised by immaturity.
There is, of course, considerable variation in decision
making skills among individuals and across contexts.
Adolescents, particularly those fifteen and older, have been
shown to mirror adults in their decision making process
about certain issues,' and adults have been shown to
engage in less mature, more pre-adolescent-like decision
making when confronted with complex or unfamiliar
circumstances.48 The law nevertheless draws a bright line
and substantially restricts all minors' (and, for the most
part,49 only minors') authority to make decisions on their
own behalf: As a general matter, minors cannot enter
binding agreements, 0 marry without parental consent,5 or
Striking a Balance Between Competing Values in Medical Decisionmaking, 1979
Wis. L. REV. 413, 439-53 (1979) (describing several different conceptions of
competence to consent applied by the courts, including a conception that asks
whether the particular decisions made by the patient were appropriate).
47. See Gary B. Melton, Children's Competence to Consent: A Problem in
Law and Science in CHILDREN'S COMPETENCE TO CONSENT 1, 15 (Gary B. Melton
et al. eds., 1983) (summarizing research suggesting that, by mid-adolescence,
children reason "as maturely as adult groups about hypothetical medical and
mental health treatment decisions"); see also Thomas Grisso & Linda Vierling,
Minors' Consent to Treatment: A Developmental Perspective, 9 PROF. PSYCH. 412,
412 (1978) (noting that "existing evidence provides no psychological grounds for
maintaining the general legal assumption that minors at age 15 and above
cannot provide competent consent").
48. See Sarah H. Ramsey, Representation of the Child in Protection
Proceedings: The Determination of Decision-Making Capacity, 17 FAM. L. Q.
287, 308 (1983) ("As more is learned about decision making, it becomes clear
that even with adults the existence [of a decision making] process does not
guarantee consistency, coherence, accurate explanation, or the integration of
relevant information.").
49. In the case of adults, the law assumes that they possess sufficient
decision making capacity and requires an individualized finding that that
capacity is lacking before the adult can be deprived of decision making
authority. See Marshall B. Kapp & Douglas Mossman, Measuring Decisional
Capacity: Cautions on the Construction of a "Capacimeter," 2 PSYCHOL. PUB
POLY & L. 73, 79-93 (1996) (considering various means of assessing an adult's
capacity to provide informed consent for medical treatment).
50. See Ellwood F. Oakley, Arbitration of Employment Discrimination
Claims and the Challenge of Contemporary Federalism, 47 S.C.L. REv. 475, 520
n.289 (1996) ("[Clourts have utilized the contract maxim of lack of capacity to
void the attempted exercise of the freedom to contract by infants and minors.").
51. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 302 (West 1994) (requiring parental consent
for marriage of any individuals under eighteen); see also KY. REV. STAT. ANN §
402.020 (Banks-Baldwin 1998) (requiring parental consent for marriage of any
individuals under eighteen, but allowing for judicial approval where the minor
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consent to their own medical care. 2
Where children have asserted a constitutional right to
make decisions for themselves, the Court has frequently
pointed to this impaired decision making capacity to justify
a minority-wide curtailment of the right. Indeed, the Court
points to this impaired decision making capacity as one of
the primary justifications for curtailing minors' abortion
rights.54 Because minors are ill-equipped to make such an
important decision on their own, the Court has concluded,
they can be required to involve either a parent or a state
is pregnant).
52. There are a few exceptions: States allow minors to consent to treatment
for sexually transmitted diseases, drug or alcohol addiction, and contraceptive
counseling or procurement. See Lainie Friedman Ross, Adolescent Sexuality and
Public Policy: A Liberal Response, POL. AND LIFE SCI 13, 14 (March 1996)
(stating that all fifty states give adolescents some autonomy in seeking
treatment for drug and alcohol abuse and contraceptive counseling and
procurement); see also Rigel Oliveri, Note, Statutory Rape Law and
Enforcement in The Wake of Welfare Reform, 52 STAN. L. REv. 463, 487 (2000)
("[A]ll the states have laws that permit minors to consent to receive care for
sexually transmitted diseases and many also allow minors to consent to
treatment for alcohol and substance abuse and psychiatric care."). These
exceptions are not grounded, however, on the view that adolescents are likely to
make particularly good decisions in these areas, but rather on the view that
adolescents are more likely to make the choice to seek treatment (the decision
the legislating adults think is good) if not required to reveal their need for
treatment to their parents. See Walter Wadlington, Medical Decision Making
For and By Children: Tensions Between Parent, State, and Child, 1994 U. ILL.
L. REV. 311, 323-34 (explaining that state provisions allowing minors to consent
to treatment for specified illnesses or conditions are based not on the states'
interest in affording children greater autonomy in these areas, but on the
state's interest in ensuring that minor's obtain important treatment that they
might not obtain if parental consent were required). Note that the development
of a "mature minor" exception in some states reflects a trend toward affording
some of the older adolescents increasing autonomy in medical decision making.
See G.S. Sigman & C. O'Connor, Exploration for Physicians of the Mature Minor
Doctrine, 119 J. PEDIATRICS 520 (1991).
53. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) ("Most children, even
in adolescence, simply are not able to make sound judgments concerning many
decisions, including their need for medical care or treatment."); see also Carey v.
Population Servs. Int'l., 431 U.S. 678, 693 n.15 (1977) (explaining that "the law
has generally regarded minors as having a lesser capability for making
important decisions," to justify its application of a less protective balancing test
in the context of regulations affecting minors).
54. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 640 (1979) ("As immature minors
often lack the ability to make fully informed choices that take account of both
immediate and long-range consequences, a State reasonably may determine
that parental consultation often is desirable and in the best interest of the
minor.").
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authority in their decision making process. 5
It is somewhat artificial to discuss minors' special
vulnerabilities and their impaired decision making skills as
two separate factors. Courts and legislatures are clearly
most concerned about children's independent decision
making in areas where bad choices will expose them to
significant, long-term harm.5 Bad decisions on important
matters will, almost by definition, produce severe harm.
Bad decisions on trivial matters often will not. For this
reason, the state has a particularly strong interest in
preventing minors from exercising decision making
authority over the very issues for which adults are afforded
the greatest constitutional protection. We protect the right
of an adult to make autonomous decisions about the
matters that will most affect the course of his life, but it is
precisely those decisions that we fear entrusting to
children.
No decision better illustrates the kind of harmful
consequences from which the State generally seeks to shield
minors than the decision to take on the responsibilities of a
parent. Moreover, the minor's decision to do so is commonly
accounted for in terms that illustrate both types of
impairments associated with adolescent decision making.
In some cases, a pregnancy and the subsequent assumption
of parenting responsibilities reflects a failure to engage in
any meaningful decision making process: Adolescent
55. The core bypass structure, first endorsed by a plurality in Bellotti, id. at
643, has since been repeatedly upheld by the Court. In its most recent
reaffirmation of this approach, the Court issued a per curiamn ruling upholding
a bypass provision struck down by the lower courts, finding that the rulings
below were "inconsistent with our precedents." Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S.
292, 299 (1997). Although the judicial bypass procedure sanctioned in numerous
cases makes an individualized assessment of each pregnant minor's maturity,
this individualized assessment occurs as part of a state procedure that applies
to all minors, and could not constitutionally be required of adults.
56. See, e.g., Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 635 ("The Court has held that the States
validly may limit the freedom of children to choose for themselves in the
making of important, affirmative choices with potentially serious
consequences."). It could be argued that adolescents' decision making capacity is
particularly likely to be deficient where short-term benefits must be weighed
against long-term risks about which they have limited understanding.
Moreover, the bad decisions children reach on matters of importance are often
pointed to as evidence of flaws in their decision making capacity. But the
language of the Court's decisions is clear in its focus on the extent of the
potential harm to the child rather than the extent of the deficiencies of the
minors' decision making abilities.
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impulsiveness, joined with vulnerability to pressure from a
male partner, leads to unprotected sex; and a failure to
take affirmative steps to pursue abortion or adoption leads
a minor to assume parental responsibilities essentially by
default when she gives birth." For those adolescents whose
pregnancies are intended,59 the decision to become pregnant
is likely based on an over-emphasis on the short-term
appeal of assuming a grown-up role and nurturing a
dependent infant," and a lack of appreciation for what is
entailed in raising a child, let alone what options may be
compromised by early parenting.6'
57. The National Campaign to Prevent Teen Pregnancy, Facts and Stats
(Mar. 31, 2000), available at http'//www.teenpregnancy.orggenlfact.htm
(reporting that "three out of four girls and over half of boys report that girls who
have sex do so because their boyfriends want them to"); see also KAPLAN, supra
note 218, at 40-42 (noting that the girls she interviewed explained that they
engaged in sex because they felt pressured by their boyfriends to do so, not
because they enjoyed it). There are those who dispute this account, suggesting
that the girls are often at least as responsible as the boys for initiating sexual
intercourse. See LEON DASH, WHEN CHILDREN WANT CHILDREN 9 (1989)
(reporting that, among the adolescents he interviewed, "tihe girls ... were
often equal--or greater-actors than their boyfriends in exploring sexuality and
becoming pregnant").
58. See Furstenberg, supra note 13, at 134 (reporting study results
suggesting that many teens become parents "by default," that is "they let
parenthood happen because they view their other choices as inferior or
difficult"); cf. Trad, supra note 16, at 135 ("Adolescents... account for a
disproportionate number of second-trimester abortions.").
59. There is some disagreement among researchers about the extent to
which minors' pregnancies are unintended. Compare Stankley K. Henshaw,
Unintended Pregnancy in the United States, 30 FAM. PLANNING PERSP. 24, 26
(1998) (reporting that over 80% of pregnancies of girls between the ages of
fifteen to seventeen were unintended) with DASH, supra note 57, at 30
(suggesting that girls often intend to get pregnant, but tend to deny this fact
when questioned).
60. Two reasons commonly offered for taking on parental responsibilities-a
desire for love from the baby and a desire to assert independence from the
minor's own mother-both suggest decision making driven by the minor's own
developmental needs, rather than an understanding of the demands and
rewards of parenting. See Nancy E. Adler & Peggy Dolcini, Psychological Issues
in Abortion for Adolescents, in ADOLESCENT ABORTION (Gary B. Melton ed.,
1986) (reporting study suggesting that, for the youngest adolescents, pregnancy
"was frequently related to a desire to become closer to her mother [whereas] in
the middle adolescent it was more likely to relate to competition with the
mother and a struggle for autonomy"); see also Kaplan, supra note 19, at 432
(reporting her finding that minors became pregnant to "feel loved").
61. See Trad, supra note 16, at 133-34 (stating that adolescent decision
making around a pregnancy reflects poor decision making skills, difficulty
envisioning the future realistically, anxiety and depression); see also KAPLAN,
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Immaturity of judgment is also likely to affect the
quality of the decisions minors make once they have
decided to undertake the parental role. An inability to
appreciate the long-term stakes will prevent pregnant
adolescents from engaging in the sort of planning for
parenthood that would increase their chances of producing
successful outcomes for themselves and for their children.
Their greater self-focus and attention to the short-term
make it more likely that they will engage in conduct, such
as smoking or avoiding healthy weight gain, that can be
harmful to the fetus.62 After giving birth, the same focus on
short rather than long-term consequences may lead minor
parents to abandon school rather than incur the significant
financial burdens associated with securing childcare. Short
term conflicts of authority between the minor parent and
her parent, so typical in adolescence, might prevent the
minor from deferring some amount of control over her child
to her parents where this would serve her long-term
interests, or those of her child. Impulsiveness and the
pressures associated with an adolescent's social life, not to
mention simple deficits of information, might inspire a
minor mother to give less than appropriate consideration to
her child's need for attention a predictable schedule,
adequate nutrition and 
the like.6
In sum, impairments in adolescent decision making are
likely to infect the adolescents' choices from the initial
participation in unprotected sex to the execution of parental
responsibilities. These impairments and the results they
produce might well justify imposing some constraints or
supra note 11, at 181 (reporting that, of the thirty-two African American teen
mothers she interviewed, 75% expressed regret at having become mothers so
young); Susan Corona Garrett & Romeria Tidwell, Differences Between
Adolescent Mothers and Nonmothers: An Interview Study, 34 ADOLESCENCE 91,
98 (1999) (reporting comments of an adolescent mother who said she had "never
really thought about the financial aspects of being a mother, about the diapers,
or about how often babies get sick. She envisioned 'all the fun stuff.' ").
62. See T.J. Mathews, Smoking During Pregnancy, 1990-96, in NATL VITAL
STAT. REP., Vol. 47, No. 10, at 2 (Nov. 19, 1998).
63. See Bernard Ineichen et al., Teenage Mothers as Breastfeeders: Attitudes
and Behaviour, 20 J. ADOLESCENCE 505, 506, 508-09 (1997) (summarizing data
suggesting that teenage mothers are less likely to breast feed at all, or for more
than a few days, than older mothers, and that the reasons for declining to
breast feed include embarrassment, pressure from theii male partner, and an
unwillingness to suffer the physical discomfort experienced when they try
breast feeding).
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guidance on that decision making process.
C. The Parental Role
The Court has also justified curtailing a minor's right to
make decisions on her own behalf by pointing to the
interference such grants of authority would impose on the
minor's parents' fulfillment of their parental role. 4 In the
words of the Bellotti Court, "the guiding role of parents in
the upbringing of their children justifies limitations on the
freedoms of minors." Echoing the language in cases
expounding parental rights, the Court notes the link
between protecting parental authority, on the one hand,
and facilitating parents' performance of their parental
duties, on the other. Only by giving parents considerable
authority over their children, the Court contends, can
parents fulfill their obligation to "inculcat[e] moral
standards, religious beliefs, and elements of good
citizenship," that will enhance a child's "chances for full
growth and maturity that make participating in a free
society meaningful and rewarding." 5 The same reasoning
that justifies limiting state's authority to intervene in
parenting decisions, the Court concludes, also justifies
limiting a child's authority to act independent of her
parents.
This justification, too, is linked to minors'
developmental status and, more particularly, can be tied to
their unique vulnerabilities and limited decision making
capacity, already discussed. Because of their decision
making impairments, the law authorizes adults to act on
their behalf. In most circumstances, it entrusts this
responsibility to parents with the expectation that parents
are in the best position, based on their superior knowledge
and bonds of affection, to assess and act in their children's
best interests. 66 Parents' responsibilities include not only
64. As with children's special vulnerabilities, this concern that the law not
interfere with parents' ability to fulfill their responsibilities has also been relied
upon to justify striking down laws circumscribing minors' rights. See Carey v.
Population Servs. Intl, 431 U.S. 678, 708 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring) (noting
that New York's law prohibiting distribution of contraceptives to minors
"unjustifiably interferes with parental interests in rearing their children").
65. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 638-39 (1979).
66. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) ("The law's concept of the
family rests on a presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in
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protecting their children from physical and psychological
harm,67  but also affirmatively influencing children's
cognitive, emotional, social and moral development.68 The
Court facilitates the fulfillment of these responsibilities
both by interpreting parents' autonomy rights expansively
and by interpreting minors' rights narrowly.
How this dual approach plays out when minor and
parent are collapsed into one individual and where two
individuals have potentially dueling parental claims is the
ultimate subject of this article. For now, however, the focus
is on the minor qua minor (and on her parent as the
parent). It is useful, I think, as part of our inquiry into the
full range of justifications offered to circumscribe the rights
maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment required for making life's
difficult decisions. More important, historically it has recognized that natural
bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their children.").
The parent-child relationship is the primary context in which children's special
needs are addressed and capacities fostered, but it is not the only context
dedicated to these tasks, and, as in the parent-child relationship, the law pairs
special duties to children with special authority over children in these other
contexts as well. In Bellotti, the Court notes the special duties assumed by the
Juvenile Court to nurture and rehabilitate juvenile offenders and the
constraints imposed on minors' exercise of certain rights of criminal procedure
to facilitate fulfillment of those duties. See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 634-35. A more
universally relevant example is the schools, which, second to parents, are
assigned the greatest responsibility for shaping children's development. Again
in this context, the Court ties the schools' special responsibilities to children to
a reduction in the protections afforded to children there. See, e.g., Veronia Sch.
Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655-56 (1995); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier,
484 U.S. 260, 271-73 (1988).
67. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968) (pointing to the
challenged law's "express recogni[tion ofl the parental role in assessing sex-
related material harmful to minors" to support its conclusion that the law
permissibly assisted parents in fulfilling their duties to their children); see also
Parham, 442 U.S. at 603 (stating that "[plarents can and must make those
judgments" concerning their children's need for medical care and treatment).
68. See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 640 (stating that a State "may further
determine... that ... consultation [with parents] is particularly desirable with
respect to the abortion decision-one that for some people raises profound moral
and religious concerns"); see also Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166
(1944) ("It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child
reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include
preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder."); Pierce v.
Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) ("The fundamental theory of liberty
upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any general power of
the State to standardize its children.... The child is not the mere creature of
the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled
with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.").
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of minors to consider how affording a minor parental rights
interferes with her own parents' ability to fulfill their
responsibilities to her.
Affording minors rights to make decisions for
themselves can interfere with parents' fulfillment of their
child rearing responsibilities in more and less direct ways.
Where minors can act on their own, their parents may lose
the opportunity to influence the decision itself and, just as
importantly, the decision making process through which
values are developed. Ceding control of certain decisions to
minors can also undermine parental control more broadly,
both by undermining the minor's perception of the parents'
authority and by placing obstacles, produced as a result of
the single decision, in the parents' path.69
In considering the state's interest in requiring parental
consent before a minor could obtain an abortion, the Bellotti
Court suggested that the state had a "special interest... in
encouraging an unmarried pregnant minor to seek the
advice of her parents in making the important decision
whether or not to bear a child." ° Encouraging parental
involvement in the abortion decision gives parents an
opportunity not only to influence the decision, but also to
provide support during the process of decision making and
then the abortion, itself. Providing this opportunity for
influence and support on a matter of considerable
importance to the minor can readily be seen as a means of
facilitating a parent's meeting of his obligations to secure
the successful upbringing of his child.
The extent to which a parent's ability to affect the
upbringing of his child will be undermined, however,
particularly if the abortion decision (and subsequent
abortion) is kept secret from the parent, is open to serious
question. The parent will lose the opportunity to engage the
child in thinking about the moral and emotional issues
implicated by the specific decision, a loss that is certainly of
some significance. But because the decision and procedure
have the consequence of maintaining the status quo in the
family's configuration (the minor remains a childless
69. See Parham, 442 U.S. at 610 (noting that ceding control to a child and
encouraging an adversarial process that pits parent against child could
undermine the parent-child relationship, generally, and the prospects for long-
term treatment).
70. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 639.
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teenager), the impairment to the parent's control over
upbringing imposed by affording the minor control over the
abortion decision may be fairly limited.
Compare this event-specific impairment to the
impairment imposed by the minor's giving birth to a child
and assuming parental responsibilities. In this context,
affording the minor autonomy not only makes it possible for
her to avoid all input from her parents over this singularly
important and life-shaping decision,7' but 'it may also
seriously encumber her parents' ability to fulfill their
parenting responsibility in all respects. 2 From the moment
the minor becomes a parent, lines of authority are
profoundly affected for the remainder of that minor's
childhood: While the adult parents still have custodial
authority over their child," they have little authority over
the most important aspect of her conduct-how she behaves
as a parent-and no direct authority over their child's
child. " Even control over matters formerly unrelated to
71. There is surely a range of views on the difference in importance between
a decision to abort and a decision to become a parent. Even among those most
concerned about the psychological and moral damage caused by the decision to
obtain an abortion would, I think, concede, that the decision to become a parent
had at least as significant an effect on the course of the minor's life, and many
would contend that the life-effects of deciding to become a parent dramatically
outweigh the effects of the decision to have an abortion.
72. See Furstenberg, supra note 13, at 132 (citing studies that suggest that
complex intergenerational child care systems are frequently "unwieldy, conflict-
ridden and unstable," and concluding that "the scant evidence suggests that we
should not too hastily embrace the assumption that three-generational family
units invariably function as effective child care systems"); see also id. at 135
(noting that Stack's conclusion that low-income parents rely effectively on kin
and friends in child rearing may not apply as well to teen parents, where "lines
of authority are unclear and the responsibilities among parents ambiguous"
when marital ties are weak and family bonds are strong); Kaplan, supra note
19, at 427 (finding that black teenage parenting can produce "long-term conflict
both in family relations and structure").
73. Most minor mothers continue to live with their custodial parent (or
parents) after giving birth. See East, supra note 19, at 306 (reporting that 80%
of teen mothers continue to live with their family of origin for at least a year
after the birth of their baby); R. Gordon et. al., Young Mothers Living with
Grandmothers and Living Apart, 1 DEv. Sci., 89, 90 (1997) (reporting that, even
before welfare reforms conditioned welfare payments on co-residence, most of
the youngest mothers lived with their mothers).
74. See Kaplan, supra note 19, at 433 (noting that, prior to becoming
mothers, the teenagers argued with their mothers about issues such as
homework, cleaning their room and T.V., whereas after they became pregnant,
many of them fought with their mothers about their pregnancies, and their
decisions to keep the babies).
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parenting, such as with whom the minor can socialize,
whether she attends schools or works, even whether she
does her homework or household chores, will be drastically
undermined by her becoming a parent: The minor will be
required to grant the baby's father access to the baby, will
be prevented from going to school or getting a job absent
the availability of suitable child care, and will be severely
restricted in the time she has available for any other
household activities.
Joined with this weakening of authority often comes an
increase in parental responsibilities. Adult parents
frequently take on considerable responsibility for caring for
the children of their children both to help their own
children complete their education, get jobs, and pursue
friendships, and to ensure that their grandchildren receive
a minimum level of care. Even to the extent this caretaking
is undertaken to improve the lot of the adolescent mother,
however, it comes at the cost of parental availability and
attention to that adolescent and to that adolescent's
siblings. 5
Adult parents who provide child care to their
grandchildren out of concern for the adequacy of their own
children's parenting have the option of reporting their
children to the child protection authorities, but there are
many reasons, all linked to their responsibilities and
feelings as parents, that they would choose not to do so.
First, most parents want to protect their children from the
stigma and potentially dire consequences associated with
being identified as an abusive or neglectful parent. Second,
entrusting the resolution of the problem to the state's child
protective system would deprive adult parents of control
over that resolution. Third, involving child protection
authorities would place the adult parent in the role of an
adverse witness, further undermining her relationship with
her adolescent daughter. Finally, demonstrating sufficient
abuse or neglect to justify state intervention might require
the adult parent to withhold the very assistance that could
help her daughter learn to parent and protect her
grandchild from harm. The fact that an adult parent, like
any other citizen, has authority to turn her daughter in for
75. See East, supra note 19, at 306 (finding that mothers of teenage mothers




abuse or neglect will offer small comfort to a parent seeking
to help her daughter in fulfillment of her own parental role.
All three of the factors set out in Bellotti would support
curtailing parental rights when applied to minors.
Becoming a parent as a minor imposes special risks, tends
to be the product of flawed decision making, and will often
severely undermine the parent-child relationship between a
minor parent and her parents. A fourth factor, not set out
in Bellotti, makes the case even stronger.
D. Third Party Costs
Many decisions considering the appropriateness of
extending legal rights to minors take into account the
special costs to third parties that would be imposed by the
extension. These special costs are often tied to the special
context, particularly the school setting, in which minors
seek to exercise their rights. In school, potentially
objectionable speech is more likely to fall on innocent, ill-
prepared ears, or to disrupt other student's enjoyment of
the educational benefit.77 In school, the harmful effects of
drug use are likely to be felt by all students.78 Context
matters in these cases because it targets the effects of the
offensive conduct on other children who, like minor rights
claimants, are vulnerable to special harms.
The Court in Bellotti makes no separate mention of
potential third-party costs of a minor's independent decision
to seek an abortion, though its consideration of the parental
role in children's upbringing acknowledges the cost, to
parents, of allowing children to make abortion decisions on
76. See Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 272 (1988) ("[A] school must
be able to take into account the emotional maturity of the intended audience in
determining whether to disseminate student speech on potentially sensitive
topics."); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986) (noting
that, among the various justifications for allowing the state to prohibit lewd
student speech was that such "speech could well be seriously damaging to its
less mature audience, many of whom were only fourteen years old and on the
threshold of awareness of human sexuality").
77. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969)
(noting that the state may constitutionally restrict student speech that would
"substantially interfere with [its] work.., or impinge upon the rights of other
students").
78. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 663 (1995) ("[1The effects
of a drug-infested school are visited not just upon the users, but upon the entire
student body and faculty, as the educational process is disrupted.").
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their own. Presumably the Court does not mention other
third party costs because any such costs that might be
imposed in the abortion context would not be expected to
vary with age. 9
In contrast, the third-party costs imposed by the
decision to undertake the responsibility of raising a child
are likely to be much greater when that parent is a minor.
Minor parents impose special burdens not only on their
parents, but also on their children. As discussed earlier,
children born to minors are more likely to have medical
educational or developmental problems, are more likely to
experience family instability, are more likely to be the
victims of abuse or neglect, and are less likely to have
consistent and long-term contact with their fathers. And
finally, teen parenting imposes high costs on society as a
whole. It is estimated that births to adolescents impose
billions of dollars of costs on society in taxpayer burdens
and lost productivity. The costs imposed on the rest of the
world by minors' decisions to act as parents are widely
perceived as huge. An interest in mitigating the costs to
adolescents, their parents, their children, and society at
large might well inspire a state to impose limits on minor's
ability to exercise parental authority.
All the justifications offered to curtail minors' legal
rights in other contexts clearly support curtailing minors'
right to undertake parental responsibilities: Undertaking
these responsibilities exposes a minor to special risks,
reflects and produces bad decision making, dramatically
interferes with the minor's own parents' ability to fulfill
their parental responsibilities, and imposes significant costs
on others. Why, then, do we see no age-based regulation of
parenting? Perhaps there is something about parental
rights that makes them uniquely resistant to such
regulation. In considering why this might be so, it will help
to begin by setting out what such age-based regulations
might look like.
79. Third-party costs might include the cost to the male partner, or other
arguably interested parties opposed to the abortion, and the cost to the fetus of
the lost opportunity to develop into a legally recognized person, neither of which
would vary with the age of the individual choosing to undergo the abortion.
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III. WHAT THE STATE MIGHT DO TO REGULATE PARENTING BY
MINORS
There are any number of approaches a state might take
in attempting to impose some constraints on a minor's
decision to take on parental responsibilities and authority.
These constraints might be aimed at discouraging a
pregnant minor's initial decision to undertake the
responsibilities of parenting at all (as opposed to
undergoing an abortion, or giving up the child for adoption),
or they might be aimed at controlling how the minor's
parental authority is exercised. We would expect the best
solutions-those most sensible as a matter of policy and,
relatedly, those most likely to survive constitutional
challenge-to address some combination of the particular
concerns associated with minor parenting discussed above.
In the discussion that follows, I will suggest a range of
possible approaches that would address one or more of
these concerns. I will attempt to organize these approaches
from most to least extreme, recognizing that, to some
extent, the options defy such an ordering.
A. Establishing A Minimum Age for Parenting
At one extreme, a state might prohibit minors below a
certain age from becoming parents under any
circumstances. A state could still permit the pregnant
minor to choose among the non-parental options-abortion"
or adoption 8 ---to avoid intruding on other rights and to
80. While, in theory, compelled abortion offers the state the most effective
means of guarding against the harmful consequences of adolescent child
bearing and child rearing, I do not consider compelled abortion an option for
several reasons. First, forcing a minor to undergo an abortion would constitute
a serious bodily intrusion, and while courts (and parents) have successfully
compelled intrusive medical procedures where determined to serve important
enough interests of the child, the complex and weighty moral and emotional
issues associated with abortion counsel against such a determination in this
context. Moreover, such an approach is likely to have serious pragmatic
problems in implementation: Minors seeking to avoid abortions will conceal
their pregnancies as long as possible until the risks and costs of the procedure
are high, if not prohibitive. Finally, a program of compelled abortion is
politically untenable: Political support for voluntary abortion is weak enough.
We can expect that political support for compelled abortion would be non-
existent.
81. The minor could even be given the choice of adoptive parents, among
those qualified by the state to adopt. For some families, the minor's own parents
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maximize the minor's involvement in decision making
within the range of state-approved choices. While clear and
simple, this would, indeed, be an extreme approach, leaving
no room for any individual to overcome a presumption of
parental incompetence, either independently, or with the
help of willing familial support. Moreover, such forced
intervention could as easily thwart as facilitate an adult
parent's exercise of parental authority. Many parents of
pregnant minors will want their children to undertake
parental responsibilities, or at least will prefer this outcome
to abortion or adoption. This approach could also expose the
minor's baby to additional risk: Compelled relinquishment
of parental rights does not guarantee the child's placement
in a family, let alone a well qualified family. Children who
are members of racial minority groups and children with
disabilities would be placed at greatest risk by such an
absolute approach.82
Somewhat less extreme would be an approach that
deferred to the wishes of the minor's parents where a minor
became pregnant below the designated age. Only when an
adult parent consented to the minor's undertaking of
parental responsibilities would a minor be allowed to do so.
Again, control of the parenting decision could be separated
from the choice between abortion and adoption, which could
still remain with the minor. A state might justify granting
parents more absolute control over their children's
parenting decisions than they are constitutionally
permitted to grant parents over their children's abortion
decisions83 by pointing to the lack of any threat to the
minor's bodily integrity associated with the parenting
decision,' and the greater implications for the adult
would be among those available to adopt the child.
82. See Amanda T. Perez, Transracial Adoption and the Federal Adoption
Subsidy, 17 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 201, 203 (1998) (noting the "severity of the
gap in placement rates between minority and non-minority children").
83. See Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976)
(holding that a state "does not have the constitutional authority to give a third
party an absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto over the decision of the physician
and his patient to terminate the patient's pregnancy, regardless of the reason
for withholding the consent").
84. It should be noted, however, that parents are afforded considerable
authority to impose medical procedures on their children, even when those
medical procedures constitute serious bodily intrusions. See Parham v. J.R., 442
U.S. 584, 603 (1979) (noting parents' obligation and authority to consent to
surgical procedures where they judge such procedures to be in their childrens'
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parents' own ability to exercise parental control associated
with that decision.'
B. Mirroring the Abortion Approach
In the abortion context, the Court has rejected states'
attempts to give parents this sort of absolute control over a
minor's decision making, but it has endorsed an approach
that permits a more child-specific assessment of capabilities
and circumstances. A state may require parental consent
before a minor can obtain an abortion, so long as it also
provides an alternative means by which a minor can secure
authorization for the abortion. That alternative process
must assess the minor for maturity and, must allow the
minor to act on her own choice, if found to be mature.
Where the minor is found to be immature, however, the
process may assess the minor's interest, both in obtaining
the abortion and in involving her parents in the decision
making process.86 Currently, sixteen states have legislation
requirin parental consent before a minor can obtain an
abortion.
Applying this two-pronged approach in our context
would facilitate parental input into the decision making
process, or, alternatively, would help to screen out, on an
individualized basis, minors least prepared to make, or act
on, such an important decision. Of course, a minor would
have no need to resort to the alternative process where her
parents agreed with her decision to undertake parental
responsibilities, but where they opposed this decision, she
would still have an opportunity to establish that she was
mature enough to make the decision on her own behalf. In
assessing her maturity, the alternative authorizer might
take account of her understanding of the responsibilities of
parenting and the extent to which she has appropriately
interest).
85. See Danforth, 428 U.S. at 75 (discussing relative effect on parenting
authority of child's decision to seek an abortion and to assume parenting
responsibilities).
86. See Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S. 292, 297-98 (1997).
87. See The Alan Guttmacher Institute, Paper: The Status of Major
Abortion-Related Laws and Policies in the States, July 2000, at http://www.agi-
sa.orglpubs/abortlawstatus.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2000) (noting that in
five of these states, enforcement of the consent requirement has been enjoined
by court order).
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planned to meet her own and her child's needs. The very
obligation to establish maturity in this context might
encourage minors to engage in a more thoughtful process of
reflection and planning.
Where the alternative reviewer determined that the
minor seeking to undertake parental responsibilities was
immature, it would need to consider whether allowing the
minor to undertake parental responsibilities against her
own parents' wishes was nevertheless appropriate. In
addition to asking whether such a parenting arrangement
was in the minor's best interests, the reviewer might
appropriately take into account the interests of the minor's
potential child as well. As noted above, compelled
relinquishment will not always serve the young child's
needs, even where it serves the interests of the minor
mother.
Note that the timing of the decision making process
would inevitably affect the range of options available. A
minor could be given the opportunity to pursue the bypass
procedure at any time during her pregnancy, if she hoped to
avoid any threat of interference from her parents or to keep
open the abortion option, should the bypass reviewer refuse
to authorize her undertaking of parental responsibilities.
On the other hand, a minor who failed to get parental
consent or a bypass authorization during her pregnancy
could still be offered an opportunity to pursue the bypass
process at birth. If she waited until this point, however, she
would have no legal shield against her parents' attempts to
influence her decision during her pregnancy (at some point
her parents would inevitably learn about the pregnancy)
and she would, of course, lose the abortion option should
parenting authorization be denied at this point. While the
bypass approach would allow for a more individualized
assessment of the minor's maturity and the interests of the
minor and child, it still anticipates compelled
relinquishment in some circumstances, an outcome which,
even where endorsed by a minor's parents, will strike most
as extreme.
C. Considering Age in Involuntary Termination Proceedings
Less extreme would be state enactments that expressly
included age among those factors that the court could
consider in determining whether to terminate parental
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rights on the grounds of unfitness, after some period of time
during which the minor would be allowed to act as parent.
Currently, states all provide a detailed list of
circumstances, and combinations of circumstances, that
reflect on a parent's "fitness," that can be used to justify an
involuntary termination.88 These lists are designed to gauge
past, present and future ability and willingness to fulfill
parental responsibilities. While a bright line rule that all
parents below a certain age are unfit will strike many,
again, as inappropriate, identifying age as a factor to be
considered along with others ought to be politically
palatable. A statute might provide, for example, that the
age of a minor could be viewed as an aggravating factor
where another ground for unfitness were established. Or a
parent's young age might be identified as relevant to a
calculation of the likely speed of improvement in parenting.
The youngest parents can be expected to take the longest to
improve their parenting abilities and commitment, and on
this ground should be most vulnerable to the termination of
their rights.89
Locating considerations of minority in involuntary
termination statutes would place the focus on protecting
the minor's child, for these statutes take no account of
whether the mother's interests are served by the
termination. The separate requirement of all states that an
involuntary termination of parental rights be in the child's
best interest would reduce the risk that a consideration of a
parent's minority would produce worse results for their
children." Locating considerations of minority in these
statutes would also have both the advantage and
disadvantage of limiting the relevance of these
considerations to a small number of the worst cases.
88. 2 ANN M. HARALAimIE, HANDLING CHILD CUSTODY, ABUSE AND ADOPTION
CASES 12-34 (1993) (listing and discussing common grounds for a finding of
parental unfitness justifying termination of parental rights).
89. Courts could take minority status into account in assessing these and
other factors supporting involuntary termination, even where age is not
expressly identified among the statutory criteria. My research suggests,
however, that courts rarely mention age in assessing fitness. But see In re Baby
Boy Scarlett, 231 N.W.2d 8 (Iowa 1975) (endorsing the termination of a minor's
parental rights and concluding that the minor's child's interests would not be
served by waiting for the minor to grow up).
90. See HARALAMBIE, supra note 88, at 15 ("In addition to proving unfitness,
neglect, or abandonment, the petitioner must prove that termination of the
parent's rights would be in the best interests of the child.").
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Typically, the state only files for involuntary termination
where there is serious evidence of parental unfitness, and
where the extended family is least willing or capable of
compensating for the parents' unfitness.9 While limiting
the states' consideration of age to this context reduces the
risk of destructive state interference in families, it also
offers no assistance to adult parents struggling to keep a
three-generation family intact.
D. Reallocating Custodial Authority Between the Minor
Parent and Her Parents
The state might also focus its attention on improving
parents' legal authority over their children who have
become parents, and over their grandchildren, who
threaten to compromise that authority and who impose
additional obligations on them. Most expansively, domestic
relations laws might be modified to award adult parents
custodial control over their grandchildren through the
period of the mother's minority. Under this regime, the
minor would still be recognized as the mother, she would
have generous rights of contact and association (forms of
visitation rights), and she could exercise as much real
authority over her child as her parents allowed. To work
effectively, the grandparent/parents would have the right to
decline this custodial authority. If a declination produced a
compelled relinquishment, the arrangement would look like
those discussed above, if it produced a minor parent with
custodial authority, the arrangement would look like the
status quo.
A state could also adjust its custody laws to expand the
grandparents' custodial authority without depriving the
minor parent of custody. The most obvious way to
accomplish this would be to award joint custody to co-
resident grandparents and minor parent during the course
of the parent's minority." The authority shared with the
91. When the extended family steps in to assist an inadequate parent, the
family is far less likely to come into the child protective service system at all
and, if it does come in, the state is far less likely to seek termination of parental
rights except in fairly unusual cases where the extended family caretaker seeks
to adopt the child herself.
92. Note that this analysis avoids any discussion of the minor parent's
partner, who has an equal right to custodial authority under the law. Because
fathers of children born to minor mothers tend to have little involvement with
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grandparents might include the entire bundle of custodial
rights, or some limited subset that would allow
grandparents to take their grandchild to the doctor, sign
him up for day care or register him for school.93 Allocating
such rights to a minors' parents need not come at the
expense of the minor's authority over the child though it
would clearly eliminate her exclusive control.' The joint
custody arrangement could be automatically extinguished
when the young parent reached majority or some other
designated age.
This joint custody approach might offer the best fit with
actual -ractice and the aspirations of the adult
parents. Just as the presumptive sharing of custodial
authority between a father and mother is designed to reflect
the actual arrangement parties commonly make, or the
arrangement the parties can comfortably modify through
informal negotiations, so, too would the sharing of custody
between a co-resident adult grandparent (often a single
their children and only rarely assert custodial claims, this omission, for
simplicity's sake, should not skew the analysis of the practical implications of
sharing custody between mother and grandparents. That being said, it is, of
course, worthwhile to consider how affording grandparents custodial authority
ought to affect the custodial authority of a non-resident father. Joint or
exclusive custody could be awarded to a grandparent in lieu of, or in addition to,
a recognition of some custodial rights in the father. To the extent increasing the
total number of those with custodial claims undermines the ability of any
custodian to exercise her authority effectively, it could be argued that a
grandparent who lives with her grandchild and provides a significant portion of
the child's care has a superior custodial claim to the non-resident father, and
that it ought be the father's burden to convince a court otherwise. Alternatively,
because these fathers are generally far less involved with their children than
either the minor mother or her parents would like, they might safely be
included among those with presumptive custodial rights absent a showing by
either the mother or the custodial grandparent that their attempt to exercise
those rights disserved the child's interests.
93. This more limited sharing of authority might be conceived as a form of
temporary or limited guardianship, recognized in some states as a means of
shifting or sharing authority during a limited period when a parent is unable to
care for a child on her own. See HAALAINBIE, supra note 88, at 641-42
(discussing temporary guardianship).
94. Again, note that fathers' equal claims, in theory, make this exclusive
control more true as a matter of practice than as a matter of right. See supra
note 92.
95. See P. Lindsay Chase-Landsdale et al., Research and Programs for
Adolescent Mothers: Missing Links and Future Promises, 40 FAM. REL. 396, 401
(1991) (noting that, for multi-generational families with teen mothers, "two
women, the child's mother and grandmother, became the central caretakers or
co-parents in the child's life").
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mother herself) and minor mother reflect the status quo, as
modified amicably into a host of variations. And just as the
presumptive allocation secures the negotiating power of
both mother and father in working out those arrangements
informally, so would the sharing of custody between mother
and grandmother increase the grandmother's leverage in
negotiating lines of authority in the three generational
household. As in the traditional two-parent couple, a
presumption of shared custody would give the grandmother
access to the courts when she believed her daughter's
exercise of parental authority was not in her grandchild's
interest." Similarly, the law could permit a minor to make
an affirmative showing that sharing custody with her
parents during her minority was not appropriate, or at least
not necessary.
An even milder custodial shift would be to afford adult
parents third-party standing to seek some custodial control
over their minor child's child when they concluded that
such control was in their grandchild's interest. The lack of
any special standing provisions for grandparents whose
children are minors is particularly striking when contrasted
with the laws enacted in all fifty states giving non-resident
grandparents third-party standing to seek court-ordered
visits with their grandchildren." While visitation claims are
96. Note that the sharing of custodial control over the grandchild would not
give the grandparent authority to go to court to assert her authority over
matters affecting the minor mother's best interests. This custodial sharing
could nevertheless be expected to assist the grandparent in asserting parental
control over the minor parent in two ways. First, the grandparent could
challenge the minor mother's exercise of parental authority that compromised
both the minor and her child's interests, and second, her ability to assert
authority over the child would clearly enhance her negotiating position with the
minor over the minor's own conduct, just as the sharing of custodial authority
enhances an individual's negotiating position on other matters contested during
a divorce.
97. While the Supreme Court recently held that Washington's application of
its third-party visitation statute violated a mother's parental rights, Troxel v.
Granville, _ U.S. _, 120 S. Ct. 2054 (2000), the Court's multiple opinions
suggest that a more narrowly tailored statute (like those already enacted in
many states) might well survive constitutional challenge. See id. at 2062
(plurality opinion) ("The problem here is not that the Washington Superior
Court intervened, but that when it did so, it gave no special weight at all to the
mother's determination of her daughters' best interests."); id. at 2066 (Souter,
J., concurring in the judgment) (concluding that the broad language of the
statute allowing "any person" to seek visitation was sufficient to render the
statute unconstitutional, thereby obviating the need to consider whether a more
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certainly different from claims to custodial authority, if
anything, the difference in circumstances between the two
groups of cases favors co-resident grandparents, whose
greater involvement in and responsibility for both their
child and grandchild suggest a greater claim to court
assistance where that involvement meets with resistance.
E. Educating and Licensing Minor Parents
The softest approach of all would be to impose some
form of educational and or licensure requirements on
would-be minor parents. 98 The expectation would be that
minors who wished to become parents would be allowed to
do so, so long as they met certain minimal requirements.
Minors might be required to take a course that would help
give them a fuller sense of their parenting obligations, both
to inform their initial choice and to improve their parenting
if they chose to undertake these obligations. It might also
involve the development of a parenting plan, to assist them
in preparing for parenting.
This kind of approach would only be as effective as its
enforcement mechanisms, which ties this approach back in
with the other options discussed. If keeping one's baby were
conditioned on a pre-birth education and licensure, then the
minor's failure to satisfy these conditions would put us back
in the world of compelled relinquishment. If contact were
withheld pending completion of these steps, then the
approach would require at least a period of separation,
which also amounts to a heavy-handed intervention. If the
narrowly crafted statute could survive constitutional challenge); id. at 2070
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (concluding that the statute "plainly sweeps in a great
deal of the permissible," and therefore the State Supreme Court erred in finding
that the broad language of the visitation statute, and the failure to require a
finding of harm, violated parents' due process rights); id. at 2078 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (noting the variety of state statutes providing for third party
visitation claims under some circumstances, and suggesting that "contemporary
practice should give us some pause before rejecting the best interests of the
child standard in all third-party visitation cases, as the Washington court has
done").
98. Some have urged licensing for all parents, regardless of age. See Hugh
LaFollette, Licensing Parents, 9 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 182 (1980). In addition to the
liberty interests implicated when dealing with adults in this context, it would
also be an enormous project. Limiting licensure to minors, or to minors whose
parents have not consented to their becoming parents, would control the
numbers.
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failure to obtain the required licensure effected some form
of the custody shift discussed above, it might motivate the
minor parent to complete the necessary education and
planning without undermining or forestalling her
relationship with her baby in the interim. Completing the
educational program and obtaining a license might also
merely make the minor eligible for special benefits, but
such a benign approach would come at the cost of a reduced
rate of compliance. Predictably, those who would fail to
meet the requirements would be those most in need of the
assistance offered by this approach.
These proposals are subject to infinite variation, and
there are surely other approaches not included in this
discussion. Each approach has its strengths and
weaknesses; some address some problems associated with
minor parenting better than others. None of these proposals
is clearly better than a world without regulation. But the
lack of an obvious best solution hardly distinguishes this
area from any other area presenting difficult policy issues
and therefore cannot account for the lack of any attempts,
along these or other lines, to control minor's exercise of
their parental rights. Strikingly, despite the high degree of
consensus about the nature and extent of the problems
associated with minor parenting, the entire fifty-state
system of legal laboratories is quiet. In the following
section, I will consider whether there is something about
parental rights that accounts for this silence, and, more
normatively, that renders them unsuitable for compromise,
even when applied to minors whose rights are routinely
restricted in other areas.
IV. THE SPECIAL NATURE OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
My earlier consideration of the proper scope of parental
rights of minors drew on the Court's analysis of minors'
rights in other contexts. That analysis suggests that a
state's circumscription of minors' parental rights could
readily be justified. Left to consider, however, is whether
the difference between parental rights and other rights
renders the generic analysis inapplicable or at least
incomplete.
In the previous section, I considered two different sorts
of potential interference with minors' parental rights-
interference that denied minors the opportunity to act as
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parents altogether, and interference that merely qualified
minors' parental authority during the period of their
minority. Because the implications of the two approaches
are very different, I will consider them separately. What an
analysis of minor's parental rights in each context shares,
however, is a common complication: It implicates the
interests of two children-the minor parent and her child-
whose developmental needs may not be equally served by
any single solution to the rights puzzle.
A. Compelled Relinquishment
Most, I think, object intuitively to the prospect of a
state's taking a baby from his birth mother against her
wishes, even if that mother is a minor, and even if her
parents have consented to the removal.99 Our objection
surely reflects our assumption that those who give birth (at
least where biologically related)' have some sort of
entitlement to their children. Such a conception of parental
rights looks uncomfortably like the old property-based
conception that has been appropriately criticized by
champions of children's interests' and widely abandoned
by the courts.0 2 Conceiving of the child as property is
troubling, generally, because it suggests a privileging of the
parent's interests over the child's and a commodification of
the child to be enjoyed or disposed of at the parent's will.
Our distaste for a proprietary conception of parental rights
might inspire us to question our intuitions grounded on this
99. I should note that, in discussing this issue with my colleagues, many
suggested that they would have no objection to such compelled relinquishments,
at least as applied to the youngest mothers.
100. Note that the link between childbirth and parental claim has become
attenuated in the context of third-party assisted reproduction, where the birth
mother is not the intended mother and, in some circumstances, does not
contribute any of her own genetic material to the child.
101. See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child?": Meyer and
Pierce and the Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995 (1992); Melissa
LaBarge, "C" is for Constitution: Recognizing the Due Process Rights of Children
in Contested Adoptions, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 318, 335 (1999) ("Children are not
merely chattels, belonging to their parents, but rather have fundamental
interests of their own which are of constitutional dimension.") (citing In re
Bridget R., 41 Cal. App. 4th 1483, 1490 (1996)).
102. Troxel, 120 S. Ct. at 2072 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("At a minimum, our
prior cases recognizing that children are, generally speaking, constitutionally
protected actors require that this Court reject any suggestion that when it
comes to parental rights, children are so much chattel.").
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conception, but the strength of our resistance to compelled
relinquishment ought also to inspire us to reconsider the
value, to both parents and children, of this proprietary
conception.
Far from trivializing the relationship between parent
and child, a parent's sense of proprietary connection with
her child arguably intensifies the value of the relationship
to her. °3 Indeed, the parent's sense of special connection
with, and vast control over, her child accounts, in large
part, for the depth and importance of the relationship to the
parent. The injury inflicted by compelled relinquishment
can be seen as especially grave precisely because the parent
experiences the taking of her child as the taking of an
important part of herself. Whether moved by biological
instincts, culturally established expectations, or some
combination of the two, a minor, too, is likely to experience
compelled relinquishment of her child as a profound
personal loss. Left to decide is whether the law ought to
entrust the weighing of that loss against the losses
associated with minor parenting to the minor or to her
parents.
Perhaps the decision whether or not to undertake
parenting responsibilities of one's own biological offspring is
too important to be taken from anyone, even a minor bent
on making the decision foolishly. While generally it is the
decisions with the most far-ranging consequences that we
do not want to leave to minors, °4 perhaps this particular
choice bears too fundamentally on a minor's personhood to
be taken away under any circumstances. The Supreme
Court's analysis in the abortion context offers some support
for this conclusion, suggesting that the particularly "grave
and indelible" consequences associated with the abortion
decision justify curtailing a parent's control over this
decision."
103. See Katharine K. Baker, Property Rules Meet Feminist Needs:
Respecting Autonomy by Valuing Connection, 59 0I0 ST. L.J. 1524 (advocating
a property law conception of custodial rights to ensure that a parent's level of
investment in the parent-child relationship and connection with the child are
given appropriate consideration).
104. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
105. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 642-43 (1979) (noting that, while
"deference to parental authority may be permissible with respect to other
choices facing a minor, the unique nature and consequences of the abortion
decision make it inappropriate, 'to give a third party an absolute, and possibly
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There are two ways, however, to read the Court's
reliance on the importance of the abortion decision, one of
which argues for imposing similar limitations on a parent's
ability to intervene in a minor's decision to undertake
parental responsibilities, and the other of which argues
against imposing such limitations in our context. To the
extent the special protection afforded to minors in the
abortion context is grounded on the nature of the decision
itself, then the converse decision to keep a child, with its
similarly "grave and indelible" and "far-reaching"
consequences ought to receive the same protection. But if
the emphasis is on the harms associated with a particular
outcome, namely the burden of unwanted teenage
motherhood,0 6 then affording less autonomy to minors
would be well justified where those minors' choices pointed
them in this dangerous direction. °7 Of course, even the
more generous, outcome neutral reading of the Court's
analysis only supports affording minors limited autonomy
over decisions related to parenting: As in the abortion
context, a minor could still be required to convince an
alternative decision making authority either that teen
parenthood was a good idea, or that the minor was mature
enough to make this important decision on her own.
Thus far, our consideration of the minor's claim of
entitlement to her child, and the harm that could come from
disregarding that claim, has focused on the interests of the
minor parent. As much as the property concept seems to
favor the parent over the child, however, it might be the
child who has a more legitimate claim to the property
protection. The very notion that specific individuals hold a
superior-indeed, exclusive-claim to connection with a
arbitrary, veto over the decision'") (quoting Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976)).
106. See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 642 (noting that "the potentially severe
detriment facing a pregnant woman is not mitigated by her minority," and,
indeed, "unwanted motherhood may be exceptionally burdensome for a minor").
107. While the Court has not, of course, said that minors should be afforded
greater autonomy in the abortion decision making context because abortions are
good for them, it could be seen as coming close in saying that such autonomy is
appropriate because the outcomes of denying autonomy-namely teenage
parenting-can be so bad. The fact that bypass judges authorize the vast
majority of abortions sought by minors suggests that these judges view the
abortion choice as a good and/or a mature choice. See, e.g., Margaret C. Crosby
& Abigail English, Mandatory Parental Involvement/Judicial Bypass Laws: Do
They Promote Adolescent Health?, 12 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 143 (1991).
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child,108 may be extremely valuable to that child despite the
potentially demeaning connotations of ownership associated
with the claim. Children should not be commodified, and
they certainly should not be freely alienable,'09 but there
may be a strong psychological value to a child's growing up
with a sense that they are where they unambiguously and
inevitably "belong.""0 While many adopted children develop
healthy and happy relationships with their adoptive
parents in the absence of this sense of inevitable and
immutable connection, this does not suggest that the loss of
that sense is not significant.
The value of this biological connection is not that it
necessarily turns minors into good parents. Indeed, the
Blackstonian notion that the biological ties create natural
bonds of affection which, in turn, inspire parents to pursue
their children's interests. may give too much credit to
biology and not enough credit to maturity. Even where the
biological connection does not inspire quality parenting,
however, it can give children this sense of the inevitability
and immutability of the parental connection which may
offset some or all of what they lose from not being shifted to
more qualified, mature parents. We know that many
children do not fare particularly well with minor parents,
but we do not know how they would fare with others,
especially if they knew that they were taken from their
birth mothers against their will."'
108. See Baker, supra note 103, at 1576.
109. See id. at 1524 n.4 (noting that not all property rights include
alienability).
110. Cf ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, NOBODY'S CHILDREN: ABUSE AND NEGLECT,
FOSTER DRIFT AND THE ADOPTION ALTERNATIVE 3 (1999) (attacking accepted
orthodoxy in the child welfare world that views children as "belonging in an
essentialist sense" to their kinship and racial groups and that locks them into
inadequate biological and foster homes.)
111. In Volume One of his Commentaries, William Blackstone wrote:
By begetting [children, parents] have entered into a voluntary
obligation, to endeavor, as far as in them lies, that the life which they
have bestowed shall be supported and preserved .... The municipal
laws in all well-regulated states have taken care to enforce this duty
though Providence has done it more effectually than any laws, by
implanting in the breast of every parent that.., in superable degree of
affection, which not even the deformity of person or mind, not even the
wickedness, ingratitude, and rebellion of children can totally suppress
or extinguish.
1 WILUAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *447-48.
112. Much of the adoption literature focuses on the problems associated
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There are other reasons to be concerned about the
state's compelling minors to relinquish babies at birth that
are not tied to a proprietary conception of parental rights.
First, we might be concerned about the state's institutional
competence to assign children to parents. States have not
shown themselves to be particularly good at determining
which children should be removed from their original
families to be placed in others, as the clumsy workings of
our foster care systems demonstrate. But, in our scenario,
the state would have no responsibility for identifying the
children to be removed, and, under the bypass proposal,
would only serve to prevent some proposed removals from
occurring. In our scenario, the only party who could compel
removal against the minor's wishes would be the minor's
parent. States would, however, be responsible for placing
removed children in new families as they already are for
many children placed voluntarily for adoption.
We might also worry whether it is realistic to expect the
state to find alternative families for babies whose
relinquishment is compelled. This would be a particular
concern for babies who are members of racial minority
groups whose placement prospects are generally more
limited. " While the diverse prospects of the child's
achieving family stability elsewhere would counsel for a
child-specific assessment of the appropriateness of
compelled relinquishment, the prospect of a state's making
race-based distinctions in determining which minors should
be permitted to raise their own children is clearly
disturbing. Finally, any regime that contemplates
compelled relinquishment is likely to be opposed by
abortion foes, who would fear the effect of such a regime on
minors' willingness to carry their fetuses to term.
Counterintuitively, the strongest arguments against
allowing compelled relinquishment, even where favored by
the minor's parents, may focus on the interests of the young
child rather than the minor parent. The young child has at
least as strong an interest as the minor parent in the
proprietary conception of parental rights, and the child
faces some real pragmatic risks if compelled relinquishment
is not linked to some guarantee that an alternative family
with children's perception of rejection by birth parents, which would be lacking
in cases of compelled relinquishment.
113. See Perez, supra note 82, at 202-06.
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will be found. The young child is in no position to protect
himself from these risks, nor can any individual be relied
upon to offer that protection. In contrast, the minor parent's
interests, including her interests in being shielded from the
harmful consequences that could flow from compelled
relinquishment, should be safe-guarded by her own parents'
involvement in the decision making. Forbidding compelled
relinquishment, or limiting the availability of compelled
relinquishment to circumstances where it is determined to
be in the young child's interest might well amount to a
privileging of the younger child's interests over those of the
older.
B. The Re-Allocation of Custodial Control
Laws that shift or share custody (between a minor
parent and her parents) or that provide third-party
standing for adult parents seeking some custodial control
over their grandchildren, offer a much milder response to
the problems associated with minor parenting. Such laws
maintain the parent-child relationship where biology has
placed it, and simply re-allocate day-to-day authority to
reflect the three-generational relational complexities, and
the generally superior parenting qualifications, of the oldest
generation. Such custodial adjustments would be designed
to respond to short term needs and to leave long-term rights
and relationships undisturbed.
Adjusting the allocation of custodial authority might
produce some significant benefits to the minor and her
child. Giving the adult parents some legal recognition of
their role in caring for their grandchild would facilitate
their fulfillment of that role by allowing them to take
actions at school, and at the doctor's, on the child's behalf.
More importantly, granting the adult parents some
custodial authority over their grandchild is likely to help
them fulfill their responsibilities to their own daughter by
reducing the extent to which the daughter's parenting and
intergenerational conflicts over that parenting get in the
way.
Such a reallocation would also come with considerable
risks. Where the prospect of compelled relinquishment
deprives the parent-child relationship of the security
derived from inevitability, custody sharing arrangements
deprive the parent-child relationship of the authority that
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comes with indivisibility. 114 Children benefit from clear lines
of authority in parenting that remain constant over time."5
Shifting custody during the period of a mother's minority
will undermine the child's perception of his mother's
authority during that first period, and will require an
adjustment of that perception when his mother becomes an
adult."' If the mother and grandparents are able to work
out the shared relationship amicably, the risks to the child
are likely to be minimal. Where the division of authority
produces conflict, the risks increase considerably.
What is less clear, however, is whether the conflicts
engendered in the context of legally shared authority would
be greater or less than those engendered under the current
regime where the minor parent has exclusive custodial
control. On the one hand, we might expect the custodial
authority of the grandparents to encourage the minor to
cooperate, in order to avoid the grandparents' resort to the
courts to enforce that authority. On the other hand, their
ability to take conflicts to the court might reduce
grandparents' commitment to cooperation. Which of these
effects would predominate is ultimately an empirical
question, as is the extent to which any harm to a minor's
parenting engendered by those conflicts would be offset by
improvements in how that minor, herself, is parented. The
lack of any efforts to experiment with alternative custody
arrangements, however, leaves us with no data to assess.
Assuming such custodial reallocations would not shock the
conscience of legislators or the courts as the compelled
relinquishments might, I am unable to account for the lack
of any exploratory legal development in this direction.
114. What might be objectionable about the state's facilitating custodial
redistribution designed to provide legal support for the work the adult parents
are already doing is what is clearly objectionable about the grandparent
visitation statutes that give non-resident grandparents standing to seek visits
with their grandchildren.
115. See Andrew S. Watson, Children, Families, and Courts: Before the Best
Interests of the Child and Parham v. J.R., 66 VA. L. REV. 653, 678-79 (1980)
(arguing that the State's piecemeal circumscription of parental authority
creates significant risks for family functioning).
116. Parental responsibilities, even if commenced during adolescence, would
largely be fulfilled in adulthood. Even the youngest potential mothers would
become adults by the time their children were about six years old.
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C. Trading the Protections of Childhood for the Rights of
Grown-ups
When parents are adults, we worry about the effect of
their exercise of parental rights on their children, but we do
not worry about the effect of that exercise on themselves.
We assume that their exercise of parental rights serves
their own interests and that the freedom to choose to
become a parent and to fulfill parental responsibilities has
a high value to them. But these assumptions may be
inappropriate for minors. We traditionally circumscribe the
exercise of rights by minors because we fear that they will
make bad choices on their own behalf, both because they
will assign the wrong values to the various options and
because they will sometimes fail to go through the process
of assigning values at all.
When I first considered the puzzle of minor's parental
rights, I made the conventional assumption that the
primary beneficiary of this generous rights allocation, if
there were one, would be the rights-holding minor. I
juxtaposed whatever interests the minor might have in
exercising these rights with all the harms that can come
from their exercise to their children, their parents, society,
and themselves. The special nature of parental rights,
however, may produce a counter-intuitive distribution of
costs and benefits between the rights holder and others
when those parental rights are exercised by minors.
A minor's child may have the most to gain from
affording minors broad parental rights, and the minor,
herself, may have the most to lose. This is not to say that
there are not gains and losses on both sides (indeed, all
sides if we include those losses suffered by the adult
parents, as well), but rather that the best justifications for
affording minors unqualified parental authority over their
children is that these children will benefit from the
certainty and constancy that it promotes. It is entirely
possible (though far from established) that what children
gain from this certainty and constancy more than offsets
what they lose in parenting quality by remaining, without
legal hesitation, in the exclusive control of their birth
mothers.117
117. Again, "exclusive" describes practice better than it describes the law, as
fathers also have rights of parental control. As noted, however, the common
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While the minor parents, themselves, might also be
harmed by qualifications of their parental rights, the harm
is less apparent, particularly where the qualifications defer
to their own parents' choices made on their behalf. Indeed it
is not clear why these same qualifications, offered as a
means of protecting minors in other areas of the law, would
so disserve minors' interests in the area of parental rights.
For older adolescents, just as with the exercise of many
other rights, it may well be misguided not to let them step
into the adult role, complete with responsibilities and
rights, when they feel ready to do so. But for the youngest
adolescents, the same concerns we have about affording
them independent control over a host of other choices seem
to apply here.
Of course, it is simplistic to suggest that the minor
parents' interests are wholly distinct from those of her
child. It goes without saying that a minor's own well being
will be tied to her sense of the success of her parenting.
Indeed, the conflict of interest could even be characterized
as an internal conflict of interest between two aspects of the
minor's development-her development as a parent, and
her broader development of an individual identity."" This
identity development, often described as the core task of
adolescent development, 9 is facilitated by an exploration of
options in work, relationships, and values. While this
exploration may be most readily accomplished by
adolescents with financial means or guarantees of support,
it may be particularly valuable for adolescents of limited
practice among children born to minor mothers is for the father to exercise little
or no custodial authority over them. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
118. See Susan J. Speiker & Lillian Bensley, Roles of Living Arrangements
and Grandmother Social Support in Adolescent Mothering and Infant
Attachment, 30 DEV. PSYCH. 102, 103 (1994) (noting that teen mothers typically
experience a clash between the developmental tasks of adolescence and
adulthood); Lowenthal & Lowenthal, supra note 8, at 29 (noting that the tasks
of adolescent development and parenting will often conflict, "meaning that a
teenage mother often will compromise one role or fail at both"); Black & Nitz,
supra note 20, at 218 (1996) (noting that where parents are adolescents
"[piroblems frequently arise because the adolescent tasks of emerging
autonomy, career development, and the formation of intimate relationships are
not necessarily consistent with the responsibilities of parenting").
119. See Harold D. Grotevant, Assigned and Chosen Identity Components: A
Process and Perspective on Their Integration, in ADOLESCENT IDENTITY
FoRMATION 73 (Gerald R. Adams et al. eds., 1992) (describing identity
development as a "key developmental task for adolescents in Western
societies").
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means, whose prospects for financial and educational
advancement and personal satisfaction through
employment are relatively bleak. In our society, individual
identity development is generally expected to precede
parental development, both because the successful
development as a parent is thought to benefit from a well
developed sense of individual identity,12 and because the
process of parental development is likely to stunt future
individual growth.2 '
Where our only concern were for the minor's
development, we might well want to encourage this
staggering of the developmental pieces by clearing a space
for traditional adolescent identity development before the
parental development is allowed to begin, or at least before
that development is allowed to take center stage. Again,
this shift in developmental focus could be accomplished
aggressively, by forbidding minors from acting as parents
120. See JANE KROGER, IDENTITY IN ADOLESCENCE: THE BALANCE BETWEEN
SELF AND OTHER 10-45 (1996) (setting out the link between identity formation
and subsequent preparedness for intimacy, in Erikson's stage scheme of crises
and resolutions); Bertram J. Cohler & Judith S. Musick, Adolescent Parenthood
and the Transition to Adulthood, in TRANSITIONS THROUGH ADOLESCENCE:
INTERPERSONAL DOMAINS AND CONTEXT 218 (Julia Graber et al. eds., 1996)
("Adolescence is to a large extent a self-oriented process, whereas parenting is -
other oriented-selfless, as opposed to being preoccupied with self and making
sense of futurity. The Assumption of the parental role requires an abundance of
precisely those emotional resources that the normal, self-centered tasks of
adolescence are likely to deplete."); Trad, supra note 16, at 137 (citing studies
suggesting that adolescent mothers have unrealistic expectations and
inaccurate perceptions of their child's development and behaviors, engage in
less verbal and interactive behavior, as well as more restrictive and punitive
behavior, and demonstrate less empathy toward their children).
121. See Cohler & Musick, supra note 120, at 210 (suggesting that
adolescents who establish an identity by becoming parents can be viewed, in
Marcia's terms, as identity "foreclosed" rather than "achieved," because they
have undertaken commitments, pursuant to the expectations of various others,
without having engaged in a process of personal searching and exploration that
Marcia, Erickson and their followers associate with a healthier, more successful
identity development); Spieker & Bensley, supra note 118, at 109 (noting that
co-residence of adolescent mother and grandmother facilitates the achievement
of adolescent goals, such as education, but may interfere with the mother's
fulfillment of the parental role, such as the establishment of a relationship of
warmth with her child); Donald B. Unger & Marcia Colley, Partner and
Grandmother Contact in Black and White Teen Parent Families, 13 J.
ADOLESCENT HEALTH 546 (1992) (noting that a grandmother's assistance with
childcare improved the teen's educational advancement, but interfered with the
young child's development, particularly if the assistance continued into middle
childhood).
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before their parents thought it was developmentally
appropriate for them to do so, or more gently by shifting
some custodial authority to the minor's parents who are
both interested in ensuring the minor's individual
development and capable of reducing the parental
responsibilities that would get in the way.
These changes in approach to minors' parental rights
would be most effective, of course, if they discouraged
minors from getting pregnant, or giving birth, or
undertaking parental responsibilities in the first place. At
least some of the appeal of taking these steps is tied to their
association with adult status,' and compromising that
status is likely to discourage some minors from taking the
steps at all. But the very deficiencies of decision making
that lead minors into parenting are likely to make them
fairly impervious to the deterrent effects of the law. Any
consideration of the proper allocation of parental rights to
minors must, therefore, also take account of the effect of
that allocation on the next generation of children.
If, in fact, affording minors broad parental rights serves
the minors' children's developmental interests, we can
easily justify privileging those interests over the
developmental interests of their minor parents that may be
disserved by this allocation of rights. The child is clearly the
more innocent party of the two, and as troubling as it is to
saddle minors with the negative consequences of their
immature decision making, it would be more troubling still
to impose those burdens on their children.
Because the minor and child's interests are so clearly
intertwined, however, the law might do better to take a less
absolute approach to parental rights. While the child has an
immediate interest in his minor mother's development as a
parent and his mother has an immediate interest in a
process of identity development likely to be cut short by a
focus on parenting, both minor mother and child are likely
122. The extent to which this motivates the decision to undertake parental
responsibilities may vary with age. See, e.g., Adler & Dolcini, supra note 60, at
78 (suggesting that, for younger children, having a baby may be perceived as a
way of getting closer to their own mothers, but for older adolescents, it is more
likely to be perceived as a means of asserting independence from their own
mothers); see also Cohler & Musick, supra note 120, at 213 (suggesting that
part of the appeal of motherhood to adolescents is that it offers a means of
resolving identity issues and achieving adult status without requiring the
imposition of distance between an adolescent and her mother).
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to benefit from successful development along both
dimensions. In the short term, parenting is likely to benefit
from identity development and the sense of
accomplishments and possibilities associated with this
development, and in the long term, parents' greater
maturity and personal accomplishments will clearly expand
the opportunities for their children. Conversely, successful
parenting will have immediate and lasting positive effects
on the minor's developing self-perception.
The hard question for policy makers is whether the law
can be structured to facilitate both forms of development
simultaneously, and whether the gains to minor and child
would outweigh losses associated with compromising a
minor's parental rights.123 While I see some promise in the
custody shifting arrangements considered in this article, I
am far less prepared to champion any particular solution
than I am to press for the opening of the laboratories.
CONCLUSION
There is a broad consensus among courts, policymakers,
and the public that minors ought not to be parents.
Nevertheless, the law does nothing to stop them, once it
fails to prevent the initial pregnancy. Whether the law
could reduce the number or authority of minor parents
without imposing greater harms on these minors or, more
likely, their children, is far from clear. The unacceptability
of the status quo offers states a compelling reason to try.
123. The requirement, imposed as a part of welfare reform, that minor
mothers live at home and attend school as a condition of receiving welfare
benefits can be seen as an attempt to combine these twin aims.
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